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I. INTRODUCTION 
Statutes in twenty-first century America are exuberantly bounteous.1 
Statutes, in the broad sense of the term, "include not only the products of state 
legislatures and Congress, but also ordinances, administrative regulations, and 
even constitutions."2 Synoptically speaking, viewed in their relation to tort law, 
statutes fall into two basic categories.3 One category comprises statutes that 
"expressly or implicitly address tort law, perhaps by creating a duty or defense or 
some particular rule of conduct."4 The other category consists of those statutes 
that do not expressly or by implication "address tort law at all but instead make 
rules to be enforced under the criminal law or by administrative regulation.''5 In 
sum, insofar as judges of tort cases are concerned, the term prescriptive statutes 
usefully describes the first category of statutes.6 The term nonprescriptive 
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 26 (3d ed. 2001) ("More than 200,000 bills are 
introduced in the 50 state legislatures each biennium, and more than 10,000 in each Congress.''); 
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND 1HE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 1 (3d ed. 2001) ("Legislation is all around us .... Statutes have infiltrated into traditional 
common law areas and created whole bodies of law to deal with the modem welfare state and to 
regulate activities of modem business."). 
2. DANB. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 133, at 311 (2000). 
3. Id 
4. Id. 
5. Id 
6. Cf id § 134, at 315 (referring to statutes that do not address tort law as nonprescriptive 
statutes). Professor Dobbs has identified six classes of prescriptive statutes in tort law: (1) 
"[s]tatutes imposing a duty but not otherwise altering the incidents of a tort claim"; (2) "[s]tatutes 
creating a new claim, duty, or defense"; (3) "[s]tatutes limiting a claim or creating defenses"; (4) 
. . 
"[s]tatutes disclaiming tort law effects"; (5) "[i]mplied disclaimer of tort effects"; and (6) 
"[p]reemptive statutes." Id § 133, at 311-14 (emphasis omitted). An example of a "[s]tatute 
imposing a duty but not otherwise altering the incidents of a tort claim" would be a rule that 
requires a landowner at certain swimming pools to post a lifeguard. Id at 311-12. This rule sets 
forth a specific duty that did "not exist at common law but does not otherwise change the rules for 
negligence, causation, defenses, and procedures." Id at 311. "Statutes creating a new claim, duty, or 
defense'' can be created "[b ]y express tenns or by implication" and go further than merely creating a 
specific duty or cause of action not existing at common law and also formulate "a set of rules about 
conduct or about adjudication." Id. at 312. An example of this type of statute is the Employers' 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §.§ 51--60 (2006), which ''creates a federal claim on behalf of railroad 
workers injured on the job" and "abolishes the defenses of contributory negligence and assumed 
risk." DOBBS, supra note 2, § 133, at 312 (citing 45 U.S.C. §51). "Statutes limiting a claim or 
creating defenses" include automobile guest statutes, '"Good Samaritan' statutes, [which] relieve 
medical doctors and sometimes others of the ordinary care standard when they give treatment in 
various emergency situations, and recreational use statutes[, which] relieve landowners of ordinary 
care standards towards recreational users of the land." !d. n.6. Examples of "[s]tatutes disclaiming 
tort law effects" include statutory provisions like the federal Occupation~ Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA). Id. at 313 (citing 29 U.S.C~ §§ 651--678). OSHA states that the statute should not be 
''construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or 
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law.'' 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). The category 
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statutes sensibly describes the second category of statutes because "[a]lthough 
such statutes prescribe no tort-law effects at all, courts are usually free 
nonetheless to adopt the standards or rules of conduct from such statutes and to 
apply them to tort cases."7 
This Article bypasses prescriptive statutes of tort law and focuses 
exclusively on nonprescriptive statutes. My thesis is as follows: The mainstream 
jurisprudential approach of finding or rejecting automatic proof of "negligence 
on the part of the violator [of a nonFrescriptive statute], subject to a limited 
range of excuses or to none at all" is unsystematic, vague, muddled, and 
wrongheaded. Instead of using touchstones of legislative intent whether the 
legislature intended to protect against the type of risk or harm that actually 
occurred and whether the legislature intended to protect the class of persons 
(including the plaintiff}-subject to considering various categories of excused 
and unexcused statutory violations, courts should engage in unabashed judicial 
policy analysis. The judicial policy analysis should consist of the pragmatics of 
recognizing violation of a nonprescriptive statute as a shortcut for the proof of 
the common law standard of reasonable care under the circumstances, with a 
baseline bias against using the nonprescriptive violation to alter the rules of the 
tort of negligence. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts that flesh out the 
trouble with the negligence per se doctrine and its analysis in American courts.9 
First, in Part II, this Article explores the shaky and confusing intellectual 
foundations of the negligence per se doctrine during the mid-nineteenth century 
up to 1920 the eve of Judge Cardozo's landmark opinion for the New York 
Court of Appeals_ in Martin v. Herzog.10 Second, in Part III, this Article analyzes 
Martin v. Herzog and judicial opinions decided in its wake, with a focus on 
recent cases decided since 2000 to show the state of modem confusion about the 
meaning of nonprescriptive statutory standards in tort. Finally, in Part IV, this 
"[i]mplied disclaimer of tort effects" includes statutes that can be construed as "implicitly excluding 
any tort-law effects'' because they "provide[] one remedy, such as a criminal sanction or an 
administrative remedy, but say[] nothing about tort remedies'' and are a radical departure from 
common law torts~ DOBBS, supra note 2, § 133, at 313. An example is a statute that require.s a 
person to report suspected child abuse. /d. at 313-14 (citing Freehauf v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole 
County, 623 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), appeal dismissed~ 629 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 
1993); Cechman v. Travis, 414 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)). "Preemptive statutes" are a 
"special case of statutes" whereby a "federal statute . . . set[s] rules of conduct and create[ s] a 
federal remedy, administrative or otherwise, and at the same time preempt[s] ot exclude[s] ordinary 
state tort law,'' such as federal warning requirements for tobacco manufacturers. Id at 314. 
7. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 134, at 315. 
8. Id § 135, at 319. 
9. While some courts use the term prima facie evidence of negligence instead of negligence 
per se, th~ difference is insignificant. See id. § 134, at 316 ("Although it is possible that a rule 
described in tenns of prima facie or presumptive negligence is a slight variant on the per se rule, the 
differences, if any, are minor indeed."). 
10. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920). 
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Article attempts to clear away the cobwebs of negligence per se methodology in 
nonprescriptive statutory standard cases. In this key part, I argue that the theory 
of law in such cases should shift from the inappropriate and confusing basis of 
legislative intent to the proper and illuminating basis of judicial policy analysis.11 
11. It is surprising that only a few legal scholars in a smattering of articles have touched on 
the efficacy of the negligence per se doctrine. See, e.g., Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se 
Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. REv. 51, 89-90 (2005) 
(discussing the problems involved in applying negligence per se to medical device litigation); 
Margaret Fordham, Breach of Statutory Duty-A Diminishing Tort, 1996 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 
362, 363, 373-74 (considering the tendency of courts to increasingly deny claims for breach of 
statutory duty); Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se: 
What's the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497, 497-500 (1998) (discussing how statutes relate to tort 
cases in Oregon); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REv. 
. .. 
1509, 1518-19 (1993) (discussing the different methods courts use in analyzing negligence per se); 
Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 
631-32 (2001) (exploring the idea of negligence per se in a welfare context); David Howarth, 
Muddying the Waters: Tort Law and the Environment from an English Perspective, 41 WASHBURN 
L.J. 469, 491 (2002) (noting that English courts do not recognize the doctrine of negligence per se); 
Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 378-
80 (2002) (considering negligence per se within the "hann-within-the-risk" analysis); Alexandra B. 
Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 N01RE 
DAME L. REV. 699, 742-45 (2006) (discussing the use of statutory standards to inform public trust 
principles); John E~ Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and Misuse of Precedent, 56 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 145, 165-69 (1987) (discussing implied rights of action); Paul Sherman, Use of 
Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHITTIER L. REv. 831, 877-908 (1992) 
(describing the increase in federal statutes and the effect of that increase on negligence per se 
actions); Mike Steenson, The Impact of "Exceptional'' Statutes on Civil Litigation in Minnesota, 26 
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 865, 866-79 (2000) (discussing "exceptional" statutes in Minnesota and 
their impact on negligence per se); Paul Yowell, Judicial Discretion in Adopting Legislative 
Standards: Texas's Solution to the Problem of Negligence PerSe?, 49 BAYLORL. REV. 109 passim 
(1997) (discussing the history of negligence per se and its overlooked issues); Nancy G. Itnyre, 
Comment, Civil Liability for Violations of Criminal Statutes, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 681,714-
716 (1998) (discussing the imposition of civil liability for the violation of a criminal statute); 
Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for Victims of 
Identity Theft: Someone Stole my Identity, Now Who is Going to Pay for it?, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 847, 
865-66 (2005) (proposing negligence per se actions as a possible recourse for identity theft 
victims). Older articles examining the negligence per se doctrine are sparse. See, e.g., Fleming 
James, Jr., Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95 passim (1950--
1951) (discussing negligence pet se in the context of accidents); Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil 
Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361, 361 (1932) (analyzing the issues 
arising from the determination that criminal statutes "entail certain civil consequences as well''); 
Clarence Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 passim 
(1933) (arguing that not every violation of a criminal statute should constitute negligence per se); 
Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 27-
34 (1949) (explaining how a finding of a violation of a criminal statute is conclusively a breach of 
duty). No scholar to date has exhaustively examined, on an in-depth basis, the origins and legal 
theory of negligence per se. 
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II. THE WEAK FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NEGLIGENCE PER SE DOCTRINE 
A. The Problem with Nonprescriptive Statutes and Tort Law 
Many statutes, ordinances, and administrative regulations, which can be 
generically referred to as statutes, "prescribe no tort law effects at all."12 For 
example, "[a] highway speed limit statute usually prescribes a criminal penalty, 
but as to tort liability it prescribes nothing.;'13 Thomas Cooley, in his late 
nineteenth century treatise on tort law, identified the following problem with 
nonprescriptive statutes: "Where the statute imposes a new duty, where none 
existed before, and gives a specific remedy for its violation, the presumption is 
that this remedy was meant to be exclusive, and the party complaining of a 
breach is confined to it."14 
However, as Professor Dan Dobbs has pointed out, "courts [have come to] 
say that violation of such a statute automatically proves negligence on the vart of 
the violator, subject only to a limited range of excuses or to none at all."1 How 
did the American judiciary arrive at this counterintuitive rule? What follows in 
this part of the Article is an attempt to sketch an intellectual history of 
negligence per se that draws chiefly upon published judicial opinions but also 
considers scholarly input. 
B. Early Judicial Opinions, 1841-1879 
The first American judicial reference to the phrase "negligence per se" 
appeared in Simpson v. Hand/6 an 1841 opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania. This case involved two ships on the Delaware River; the owners 
of an anchored schooner, the Thorn, sought damages against the owners of the 
brig; the William Henry, stemming from a nighttime collision.17 In commenting 
on the conflicting trial testimony on the issue of whether or not the Thorn had a 
signal lantern to warn the approaching vessel, the William Henry, Chief Justice 
Gibson included the following colorful dictum in his opinion: 
Indeed, the hoisting of a light is a precaution so imperiously demanded 
by prudence, that I know not how the omission of it could be qualified 
by circumstances, any more than could the leaving of a crate of china in 
12. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 318. 
13. Id 
14. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH 
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 783 (2d ed. 1888). 
15. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 318-19. 
16. 6 Whart. 311, 323 (Pa. 1841). 
17. I d. at 311. 
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the track of a railroad car; or how it could be considered otherwise than 
1. 18 as neg 1gence per se. 
So negligence per se parlance began with a maritime case that did not 
mention a statute but rather a nautical custom that demanded, in the court's view, 
the anchored vessel to have a warning light as a matter of law.19 Failure to abide 
by the custom meant that the Thorn's ';people were obnoxious to such a charge 
of negligence as would bar the action."2 
The next judicial reference to negligence per se parlance occurred ten years 
later, in 1851, in another nighttime ship collision case off the coast of the new 
state of California?1 The Supreme Court of California, in Innis v. Steamer 
Senator,22 parroted the exact dicta from Simpson the seminal Pennsylvania 
case.
23 Interestingly enough, also in 1851, the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
distinguished the facts in its case, Sparks v. Steamer Saladin,24 which involved a 
collision between a steamboat on the Mississippi River with a moored flatboat 
on a foggy night, from the facts in Simpson.25 Plaintiff, a flatboat owner, sued the 
steamboat for negligence.26 On appeal, counsel for the defendants cited the 
negligence per se dicta from Simpson?7 According to Justice Slidell of the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, the ''context and the facts''28 involving 
the Mississippi River collision were different from the context of the 
Pennsylvania maritime collision: 
The present case is a very different one. Here was a flatboat tied to 
the bank at a place appropriated to that sort of craft, at a considerable 
distance from the landing appropriated to steamboats; there was no want 
of conformity to custom, whereby a false confidence could be given to 
an approaching vessel; nor does there appear to have been any reason 
for the owner of the flatboat to expect that a steamboat would come to 
that part of the bank of the river.29 
So the first three published judicial decisions that used negligence per se 
parlance were common law maritime vessel collision cases that considered the 
18. !d. at 323. 
19. Id. at 323-24. 
20. ld. at 324. 
21. Innis v. Steamer Senator, 1 Cal. 459, 459-60 (1851). 
22. 1 Cal. 459 (1851). 
23. Id at 460-61 (quoting Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323-24). 
24. 6 La. Ann. 764 (1851). 
25. !d. at 764-65 (citing Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323). 
26. Id. at 764. 
27. I d. (citing Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323). 
28. !d. at 765. 
29. !d. 
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context and custom of moored vessels deploying warning lights at night. While 
the Pennsylvania and the California cases involved clear-cut local customs for a 
moored vessel to use warning lights triggering judicial conclusions that, as a 
matter of law, failure to have lights constituted negligent conduct the Louisiana 
case involved different facts and circumstances such that the court was unwilling 
to conclude that a failure to have warning lights on the stationary vessel at night 
was negligence as a matter of law.30 But none of these early negligence per se 
cases involved statutes.31 · 
The first judicial considerations of the effect of statutory enactments 
regarding the duty of due care were a pair of railroad cases decided in 1854: a 
New York trial court opinion, Langlois v. Buffalo & Rochester Rail Road Co.,32 
and a Supreme Court of Vermont opinion, Morse v. Rutland & Burlington 
Railroad Co.33 
In Langlois, a New York trial court noted the existence of a state statute that 
obligated railroads '~o erect and maintain fences" on the sides of their tracks; if a 
railroad failed to erect these fences, the statute created liabilizy "'for all 
damages'" caused by the train "'to cattle, horses or animals thereon."'34 The case 
at bar involved a railroad employee who died from injuries sustained when a 
train engine and attached coal tender were overturned by straying cattle.35 Justice 
T.R. Strong concluded that the statute did not impose a duty on the railroad to 
prevent human death or injury.36 He phrased the question, to which he answered 
in the negative, in the following manner: 
It is undoubtedly true that fences along our lines or rail roads, 
protecting the tracks from cattle on adjoining lands, are an important 
measure of security, both to the agents and servants of rail road 
corporations, and to the public; but in the absence of a legislative 
provision making their erection an absolute duty to the public, can the 
30. Compare Innis v. Steamer Senator, 1 Cal. 459, 459~0 (1851) ("[T]he Court should have 
instructed the jury that want of a light and a watch, in the position of the Rhode Island, was such 
negligence on her part, as to prevent a recovery.''), and Simpson, 6 Whart. at 323-24 e'[T]he 
hoisting of a light is a precaution so imperiously demanded by prudence, that I know not how the 
omission of it could be qualified by circumstances ... or how it could be considered otherwise than 
as negligence per se.''), with Sparks, 6 La. Ann. at 765 (holding that the case was "a very different 
one" from Simpson and refusing to fmd negligence per se ). 
31. See Innis, 1 Cal. 459; Sparks, 6 La. Ann. 764; Simpson, 6 Whart. 311. 
32. 19 Barb. 364 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1854). 
33. 27 Vt. 49 (1854). 
34. 19 Barb. at 369 (quoting 1850 N.Y. Laws 233). 
35. Id. at 365-66. 
36. See id. at 369. 
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courts properly impose it as a duty, and hold its non-performance, per 
se, negligence, disregarding all other circumstances?37 
While the trial court judge in Langlois did not directly say so, it appears that 
the motivation for his decision not to create negligence per se liability for 
wrongful death was the lack of a proper fit between the claimed injury with the 
class of persons protected by the New York statute animal owners and and 
the type of injury contemplated by the statute damage or death ofanimals.38 
The Supreme Court of Vermont's opinion in Morse involved an analysis of a 
Vermont railroad fencing statute.39 The court construed the statute narrowly such 
that there was no duty to the plaintiff (whose cattle initially strayed from the 
owner's land onto a neighbor's lot that adjoined the railroad tracks and then 
ultimately strayed onto the tracks) because a duty was owed only to the 
landowner whose land abutted the railroad.40 The court also concluded that the 
speed of the locomotive was not negligence per se and that the common law 
standard of ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances was warranted.41 
In 1866, the Court of Appeals of New York applied a negligence per se 
analysis in Ernst v. Hudson River Railroad Co.,42 making it the first case in 
which an American appellate court found a defendant negligent for violating a 
statute. In reversing a nonsuit for a wrongful death action involving a teamster 
driving a two-horse sleigh across train tracks, the court had the occasion to 
expound on the significance of the railroad's failure to sound its whistle and ring 
its bell in violation of a New York statute.43 Judge Porter held: 
This was an act in open defiance of a public statute, enacted for the 
protection of the traveler. It was a flagrant breach of duty to the 
passengers, whose safety it jeopardized, to the stockholders, whose 
property it imperiled, and to the testator, whose life it exposed. Its direct 
tendency was to put him off his guard, to disarm his vigilance, and to 
produce a false sense of security .... It is not the policy of the law to 
favor those who deliberately violate its mandates, nor is it the duty of 
the courts to invent excuses for wrong-doers, or to palliate the guilt of 
reckless homicide. Our statutes for the protection of life are to be 
obeyed; and when they are broken and defied, responsibility is not to be 
37. Id at 370. 
38. See id at 369-70. 
39. Morse v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 49, 52 (1854) (citing Vt. Comp. Stat. ch. 
26, § 41 (1849)). 
40. Id. at 53-54 (citing Jackson v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 150, 161 (1853)). 
41. Id at 54. 
42. 35 N.Y. 9 (1866). 
43. !d. at 22, 28-29. 
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invaded by imputing blame, without proof, to him who suffers death, for 
the sake of shielding those who inflict it.44 
229 
The court's opinion in Ernst is fraught with emotional condemnation of the 
locomotive crew who failed to follow the whistle and bell statute.45 
Two years later, in the 1869 case St. Louis, Jacksonville & Chicago Railroad 
Co. v. Terhune,46 the Supreme Court of Illinois utilized negligence per se 
concepts to uphold a railroad's liability in another whistle and bell statutory 
violation case this time, for the destruction of two cows by a locomotive.47 
An 1875 federal trial court opinion, Adams v. West Roxbury,48 involved a 
workplace personal injury action by an employee of a street repair crew who was 
seriously injured by explosives that went off accidentally.49 The court seemed to 
hint at what became in later years strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities50 when it asked in passing if "[t]he use of exploders in blasting, not 
being ... negligence per se, and the town having procured exploders ... [which] 
were generally deemed to be a good safe article ... , what higher degree of care 
could be required of the master?''51 The court went on, however, to reject a strict 
44. Id at 28-29. Curiously, in Ernst, the Court of Appeals of New York made no reference to 
its decision just six years prior in Brown v. Buffalo & State Line Railroad Co., 22 N.Y. 191 (1860). 
That case, as described by Professor Dobbs, "reject[ed] the idea that a criminal statute would have 
tort law effect.'' DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 319 n.2 (citing Brown, 22 N.Y. 191). Perhaps the 
fact that the plaintiff in Ernst was the widow of a hapless teamster affected the court's view of the 
tort law effect of the violation by the railroad of a quasi-criminal statute. 
45. See Ernst, 35 N.Y. at 28-29. The Court of Appeals of New York utilized negligence per 
se parlance in another 1866 train accident case, Willis v. Long Island Railroad Co., 34 N.Y. 670, 
675-76 (1866). However, like the maritime cases discussed above, see supra notes 16-31 and 
accompanying text, the negligence per se language was not used to describe the breach of a 
statutory standard but rather to refer to conduct that was claimed to be clearly uncareful. Willis, 34 
N.Y. at 675-76. Other courts used similar negligence per se language in early railroad cases. See, 
e.g., Ohio & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 Ill. 497, 500 (1868) ("In that case, as in this, it was 
contended, that it was negligence per se to permit dry weeds and grass to accumulate on the right of 
way of a railway company; that its presence there created a legal presumption of negligence.''); 
Pittsburg & Connellsville R~R. Co. y. McClurg, 56 Pa. 294, 300 (1867) ("In conclusion, we have 
simply to reassert, that where a traveller puts his elbow or an ann out of a car window, voluntarily, 
without any qualifying circll11lstances impelling him to it, it must be regarded as negligence in se; 
and when that is the state of the evidence it is the duty of the court to declare the act negligence in 
law."). For similar, nonstatutory use of negligence per se language in an early case involving an 
owner of a mule killed by the bad repair of a canal towpath, see Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Bentley, 
66 Pa. 30, 33 (1870). 
46. 50 Ill. 151 (1869). 
47. Id at 153-54. 
48. 1 F. Cas. 152 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 67). 
49. Id. at 152-53. 
50. For an explanation of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, see 
RESTA1EI\1ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 519-520 (1976). 
51. Adams, 1 F. Cas. at 154. 
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liability theory, shifting back to ordinary negligence principles in the following 
excerpt: 
If a master should procure a box of percussion caps from a well 
known respectable manufacturer, which were by the community at 
large, generally considered safe and free from danger, would it be 
expected of him that he should use up a large portion of the contents of 
the box in testing them before he put them in the hands of his servants 
for use? Could he not well rely on the standing and reputation of the 
maker of the article for his putting on the market a safe and proper cap, 
and if on careful inspection they were apparently all right, and no defect 
could be discoverable, should he be deemed guilty of negligence, if 
under such circumstances he procured and used them in his business?52 
C. The Run Up to Cardozo's Opinion in Martin v. Herzog, 1880-1920 
During the forty-one year period of 1880 through 1920, there was an 
explosion of judici~l. reference~ ~o the. phrase "neBligence per se," wit~ 3,419 
state and federal optntons contatntng thts language.5 The cases are a galltmaufry 
of holdings and dicta. Some cases do not address statutes or ordinances on civil 
liability at all but rather utilize ''negligence per se" to consider whether conduct 
of litigants could be construed as lacking due care as a matter of law. 54 Other 
52. Id. at 155. 
53. Based on a Westlaw search of the phrase "negligence per se" in the "all cases" database 
with a query of dates between 1879 and 1921 (search conducted on Oct. 31, 2009). 
54. See, e.g., Mammoth Vein Coal Co. v. Johnson, 127 S.W. 971, 971 (Ark. 1910) (citing 
Johnson v. Mammoth Vein Coal Co., 114 S.W. 722, 729 (Ark. 1908)) (deciding that it is not 
negligent as a matter of law for a coal miner to continue working in a dangerous part of the mine); 
Meeks v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 56 Cal. 513; 517 (1880) (citing Meeks v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 52 CaL 602, 
604-05 (1878)) (hearing an appeal of a plaintiff who fell asleep on train tracks); Girtman Bros. v. 
Eaton, 59 So. 397, 399 (Fla. 1912) ("It is not negligence per se for an iron rod in a wagon to 
protrude from the wagon as it passes along a street.''); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Simons, 
79 N .E. 911, 915 (Ind. 1907) (holding that it is not negligent as a matter of law for a railroad to 
leave its switches unblocked); Middleton v. City of Cedar Falls, 153 N.W. 1040, 1046 (Iowa 1915) 
("It is not negligence per se for a person to pass over a street or sidewalk in the nighttime."); Wolf 
v. Des Moines Elevator Co., 98 N.W. 301, 302 (Iowa 1904) (explaining that it is not negligent as a 
matter of law to establish a "factory, shop, or other industrial plant" near a public thoroughfare); 
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Morgan, 22 P. 995, 1000 (Kan. 1890) (''The plaintiff is not precluded 
from recovery because on approaching the railroad crossing he did not stop.''); Kelly v. S. Minn. R. 
Co., 9 N.W. 588, 590 (Minn. 1881), overruled on other grounds by Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. 
Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883) ("In the present case a court would have no right to hold 
that it was negligence per se to attempt to drive over this [railroad] crossing with knowledge of the 
fact of the removal of [a] plank. That was eminently a proper question for .. . the jury .... "); Smith 
v. Mo. Pac~ Ry. Co., 20 S.W~ 896, 898 (Mo. 1892) (stating that it is not negligent as a matter of law 
for a railroad to have three freight trains converge on a single station at the same time); Hendricks v. 
W. Union Tel. Co., 35 S.E. 543, 546 (N.C. 1900) (indicating that it is not negligence per se for a 
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cases decided during this time frame use negligence per se terminology to 
describe what has come to be called a rule of law a judicial determination that 
specified conduct automatically breaches a standard of reasonable care. 55 Still 
other cas.es lacking statutory referents utilize ''negligence p.er se'' as a rhetorical 
trope.56 . 
Numerous judicial opinions during the 1880-1920 period refer, in a 
perfunctory and mechanical way, to the proposition that the violation of a statute 
or municipal ordinance is or is not negligence per se or mere evidence of 
negligence in a civil action seeking compensatory damages. 57 
Only a handful of judicial opinions during this approximately four decade 
time frame attempted to explain the rationale for grafting a nonprescriptive 
statutory standard onto a civil action for the tort of negligence. Surprisingly, the 
rather o?scure Supre~e Court of the Territo~ ofN~w .Mexico, in the 1~97 case 
of Cerrzllos Coal Ra1lroad Co. v. Deserant, provided what may be viewed as 
the first quasi-scholarly American judicial opinion to explore the emerging 
doctrine of negligence per se. Cerrillos was a wrongful death action by the 
telephone company to fail to promptly notify the sender that a message could not be delivered); 
Palmer v. Willamette ValleyS. Ry. Co., 171 P. 1169, 1172 (Or~ 1918) (noting a split of authority on 
whether it is negligent as a matter of law for a passenger to board a moving train); Gulf, C. & S. F. 
Ry. Co. v. Cusenberry, 26 S.W. 43, 46 (Tex. 1894) ("It is not negligence. per se for a railroad 
company to permit grass and weeds, or other combustible matter, to accumulate upon its right of 
way.'' (citing Gram v. N. Pac. R. Co.; 46 N.W. 972, 975 (N.D.1890))). 
55. See, e.g., Gothard v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 67 Ala. 114, 116-17 (18:80) (stating the duty 
of a wagon driver to look and listen for approaching trains before crossing tracks); Plummer v. E. 
R.R. Co., 73 Me. 591, 593 (1882) (quoting Grows v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 67 Me. 100, 104 (1877)) 
(stating the duty to look for approaching trains). 
. . . 
56. See, e.g., Jordan v. McNeil, 25 Kan. 459, 461 (1881) ("Is it, as an abstract question of 
law, negligence per se for a client to rely upon the professional integrity of a Kansas lawyer?"). 
57. See, e.g., Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Golden, 21 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1894) 
(considering railroad's failure to signal warnings to persons not near a crossing); Lake Shore & M. 
S. Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 76 N.E. 629, 630-31 (Ind. 1906) (finding that the. running of a train over a 
country highway crossing at fifty miles per hour is not negligence per se); Chesapeake Beach Ry. 
Co. v. Donahue, 68 A. 507,509 (Md. 1908) (holding that trepassing deliberately on railroad tracks 
.constitutes negligence per se); Babel v. Manning, 70 N.W. 327, 330 (Mich. 1897) (holding that 
violating a gun safety statute is negligence per se); Bowman v. Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 85 Mo. 533, 
538 (1885) (citing Kelley v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 75 Mo. 138, 142 (1881); Karle v. 
Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R. Co., 55 Mo. 476, 483 (1874)) (analyzing the 
violation of a train speeding ordinance); Morrison v. Lee, 133 N.W. 548, 550 (N.D. 1911) (stating 
that the violation of a statute constituting negligence per se did "not abrogate the defense of 
contributory negligence'' without a legislative intent to do so); Crowl v. W. Coast Steel Co., 186 P. 
866, 870 (Wash. 1920) (explaining that violation of a pedestrian crossing ordinance is negligence 
per se); O'Brien v. Wash. Water Power Co., 129 P. 391, 394 (Wash. 1913) (citing Wilson v. Puget 
Sound Elec .. Ry. Co., 101 P .. 50, 54 (Wash. 1909); Engelker v. Seattle Elec. Co., 96 P .. 1039, 1039-
40 (Wash. 1908)) (operating a street car at a_ rate of speed in excess of that permitted by ordinance is 
negligence per se ). 
58. 49 P. 807 (N.M. 1897), overruled on other grounds by Stang v. Hertz Corp., 467 P.2d 14, 
18 (N.M. 1970). 
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survivors _of~ coal miner who d~ed ~along_ with t':enty-tw~ other miners) from 
an explosion 1n a room of the mtne. 5 Justtce Collter descrtbed the 1891 Act of 
Congress that was at issue in the case: 
The act . . . provides that managers or owners of coal mines shall 
provide adequate ventilation of not less than so many cubic feet of air 
per minute for so many men, and ... force same through the mine ... to 
dilute and render harmless noxious and poisonous gases, and to keep all 
working places clear of standing gas.60 
Initially, the territorial court noted that "[i]t has been laid down in a recent work 
of high authority that a breach of a statutory duty is negligence per se.''61 But 
then the Cerrillos opinion observed: "Such, however, does not seem to be the 
view of the United States [S]upreme [C]ourt''62 In support of this proposition, 
the territorial court cited four previous Supreme Court railroad opinions as 
authority for making "[b ]reaches of statute or ordinance'' mere evidence of 
negligence.63 Applying the mere evidence of negligence standard that it derived 
59. Id at 807. 
60. Id at 812. The federal statute at bar was simply cited as an "act of congress passed March 
3, 1891." /d. The statute referred to by the court is probably Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 564, 26 Stat. 
1104. 
61. Cerrillos, 49 P. at 812 (citing 3 BYRON K. ELLIOT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOT, A TREATISE 
ONTHELAWOFEVIDENCE § 1155 (18_97)). 
62. /d. 
63. /d. (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 282-83 (1894); Grand Trunk 
Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 418 (1892); Hayes v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., Ill U.S. 228, 239-40 
(1884); Randall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 478, 485 (1883)). Interestingly, the frrst opinion 
by the Supreme Court of the United States to use negligence per se parlance explicitly was Grand 
Trunk Railway Co. v. Ives. See 144 U.S. at 418. Ives involved a wrongful death action by survivors 
of a Michigan fanner who was struck by a train while crossing a railroad track in his horse-drawn 
buggy. !d. at 409-11. lves was brought in a Michigan state court and removed to federal court on 
the basis of diversity of citizenship. /d. at 409. A Detroit city ordinance set a train speed limit of six 
miles per hour~ Id at 411. The Supreme Court began its analysis of the applicability of the 
ordinance by discussing the "reasonable and prudent'' standard of care in a negligence suit. Id at 
417. The Court went on to observe: ''Indeed, it has been held in many cases that the running of 
railroad trains within the limits of a city at a rate of speed greater than is allowed by an ordinance of 
such city is negligence, per se." Id at 418 (citing Schlereth v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mo. 509, 515 
(1888); Va. Mid. R.R. Co. v. White, 84 Va. 498, 502 (1888)}. Without further explanation, 
however, the Court concluded: "But, perhaps, the better and more generally accepted rule is that 
such an act . . . is always to be considered by the jury as at least a circumstance from which 
negligence may be inferred in detennining whether the company was or was not guilty of 
negligence." /d. (citing five different state cases to support its conclusion).. The lves Court did not 
provide any comparison to the question of violation of a state statute; however, later in its opinion, 
the Court construed a statute delegating authority to a railroad commissioner in deciding whether a 
flagman should be posted at a railroad crossing. Id at 421-22. In the situation where the 
commissioner had decided not to require a flagman at the crossing at bar, the Court construed the 
statute as giving rise to the following construction: "[A] railroad company, under certain 
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from previous Supreme Court precedent, the Cerrillos court reasoned, in rather 
opaque language, as follows: 
Where the means to be adopted for securing requisite ventilation were 
not prescribed [in the 1891 Act], but congress contented itself with 
general directions, it should be held that reasonable effort is to be 
exerted to attain and maintain this result. If this result were neither 
attained nor maintained, it would then be the jury's province to say 
whether, under all the circumstances, this failure was or not due to 
negligence by the defendant 64 
While the Cerrillos opinion questioned the negligence per se doctrine 
utilized by other courts and a treatise writer, the basis of the skepticism was 
sketchy, unexamined dicta from United States Supreme Court precedent. But, at 
least the Cerrillos court made a persuasive albeit somewhat turgid logical 
argument that a statute that set forth a general standard as opposed to a specific 
standard should do no more than assist the jury to assess the context of care 
. . . 
that ultimately should govern the case. The general standard, according to this 
line of reasoning, should not sidetrack the trier of fact in making its own 
independent judgment based on all of the evidence adduced at trial in 
determining whether the defendant's conduct fell below a standard of reasonable 
care under the circumstances. 
In Southern Railway Co. v. Bryan,65 the Supreme Court of Alabama, in a 
thoughtful but flawed 1899 opinion authored for the court by Justice 
Haralson, offered a searching and analytical account of the negligence per se 
doctrine.66 Bryan was a wrongful death action brought by a deceased railroad 
engineer's wife; the engineer died in a nighttime collision with another train that 
was not sufficiently lit.67 An Alabama penal statute (first enacted in 1867 and 
amended twice) established a twofold duty on railroad officers operating trains 
within the state.68 As paraphrased by Justice Haralson, these legislative 
prescriptions required that a train come to a full stop within 100 feet of a place of 
crossing of two tracks and that a stopped train '"not proceed until [the ·engineer 
and conductor] know the way to be clear,"' with a criminal fine, imprisonment, 
circumstances, will not be held free from negligence, even though it may have complied literally 
with the terms of a statute prescribing certain signals to be given, and other precautions .... " Id at 
420--21. According to the Court, the rationale for this rule of construction is that "other measures," 
not specified in the statute, may be dictated by "public safety and common prudence'' under the 
circumstances of the case. Id at 421 (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Perkins, 125 Ill. 
127, 131 (1888)). 
64. Cerrillos, 49 P. at 812. 
65. 28 So. 445 (Ala. 1899). 
66. Id at 449. 
67. I d. at 445-46. 
68. /d. at 447 (citing 1898 Ala. Laws 44). 
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or "hard labor for the county" as possible penalties for violation.69 The issue on 
appeal was whether the trial court properly considered negligence per se where 
there was evidence that the decedent engineer failed to take appropriate 
precautions before crossing the track intersection.70 As explained by the court, 
''[ e ]ach train may reasonably indulge the presumption, that the other will comply 
with the mandates of the statute, but this presumption will not protect either from 
liability for want of care in proceeding, when it becomes apparent, or reasonably 
so, that the other train is negligent and disobedient."71 The heart of the Alabama 
opinion focused on interpreting the meaning of the state statute's command that 
train officials, stopped at a track crossroads, "'must not proceed until they know 
the way to be clear. '"72 In a detailed consideration of this legal problem, Justice 
Haralson opined for the court: 
Can the knowledge required to be had by the engineer and conductor, 
that the way is clear, mean less, than that they shall take such steps as 
are necessary to inform and make themselves certain, and not be 
doubtful of the fact? If one upon whom such a duty is imposed, takes the 
necessary steps to thus make himself aware of the situation at or about 
the crossing, and uses all diligence necessary to that end, and there is an 
absence of another train, so far as the diligent exercise of his senses will 
discover, with which he may collide, this would be knowledge on his 
part, such as the law requires. But, to acquire such knowledge, he must 
exhaust all necessary means to make himself certain; or, in other words, 
he must exercise not simply ordinary, but the highest degree of diligence 
to ascertain that the way is clear. This knowledge may not imply, 
however, that the way will certainly remain clear against all after-
occurring, extraordinary, unanticipated and unascertainable 
happenings. 73 
At this juncture in the opinion, the Supreme Court of Alabama tried to 
discern the elusive intent of the state legislature in passing a penal statute that did 
not explicitly provide that the penal standard of care should be transposed to a 
civil tort action predicated on negligence: 
This statute is not merely declaratory of the common law. Without 
it, the duty of an engineer would require him to use reasonable, or 
ordinary care to avoid collision, to stop if necessary, and not proceed 
69. Id at 447-48. 
70. Id. at 448. 
71. Id at 447. 
72. I d. at 448. 
73. !d. at 448-49. 
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until, by reasonable diligence, he ascertains that he may do so safely. If 
nothing more than ordinary care is required under the statute, it would 
seem, it may as well, for the ends proposed, have not been adopted. The 
legislature evidently did not deem such degree of care sufficient in such 
an emergency, where the danger to life and property is so great; and the 
statutes were passed, manifestly, to impose a higher degree of diligence 
than was theretofore required, extraordinary care on the part of those 
running trains to prevent collisions such as that with which we deal. The 
officers upon whom the duties imposed by the statute are devolved, 
cannot neglect their discharge, without committing a Renal offense, and 
rendering their company liable for consequent injuries.74 
235 
While the court's analysis regarding legislative intent was a respectable 
attempt to unpack the meaning of the specific penal command, the reasoning was 
deficient in several respects. First, the opinion did not grapple with the question 
of whether the common law duty of reasonable care, applicable to tort actions for 
compensatory damages, should be displaced by a criminal standard of 
extraordinary care. Second, the court failed to explain how the assumed 
legislatively-posited duty of extraordinary care could ever be successfully met by 
a person like the decedent engineer, who could not perceive the other train 
(operating without lights) in the darkness of night. Third, without saying so, the 
opinion turns on its head the usual lenity the law of torts accords to individuals 
behaving under emergency conditions to a virtual strict liability standard of care. 
Fourth, the court contradicted itself by, on the one hand, quoting a learned 
treatise by Elliott that ~''ordinarily the omission of the statutory duty is 
negligence per se, and that where the omission is established, such negligence 
arises as a matter of law, '''75 and then, on the other hand, going on to conclude 
that "by the very terms of the statute," the engineer was "forbidden absolutely to 
cross the tracks, until [he] knew the way to be clear for [his train] to pass in 
safety," when he could never know with certitude under the circumstances that it 
was all clear.76 Finally, the opinion made the erroneous conclusion that the 
court's hands were tied: "If we preserve the integrity of the statute, we see no 
escape from the conclusion we reach."77 To the contrary, because the statute was 
a nonprescriptive penal statute (theoretically applicable only in a criminal 
prosecution), the Alabama court had judicial discretion to find the statute 
inapplicable to a wrongful death action sounding in negligence. 
74. Id. at 449. 
75. I d. (emphasis added) (quoting ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 61, § 1155, at 1745). 
76. I d. at 449-50. 
77. !d. at 450. 
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The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in the 1905 case of Borneman v. 
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company,78 issued a 
commendable summary of differing judicial interpretations of ordinances or 
statutes in American courts.79 Borneman involved an action in negligence 
against a railroad for the plaintiffs loss of a horse that was killed at a railroad 
crossing.80 The plaintiff alleged that the railroad violated a city ordinance setting 
forth a speed limit and a requirement that a ''bell ... be rung continually on all 
engines while running within the city limits."81 The court stated the following: 
Many cases lay down the rule that the violation of a statute or ordinance 
constitutes negligence per se, or conclusive evidence of negligence. The 
rule of other cases seems to be that the violation of a statute or 
municipal ordinance is prima facie evidence of negligence. In still other 
cases the courts have been content with the announcement that evidence 
. . . ' 
of the fact that the defendant's act constituted the violation of a state or 
municipal law is proper for the consideration of the jury in determining 
whether the defendant was in fact negligent.82 
While the Borneman court's paraphrase of what the justices discerned to be 
three extant judicial approaches to the construction of nonprescriptive statutory 
violations in negligence cases was pithy and lucid, the court following in the 
footsteps of previous judicial pronouncements on the subject failed to 
articulate any rationale for choosing from among the three approaches other than 
the authority of precedent.83 Indeed, like earlier opinions, the jurists did not 
address the essential legal question of why a penal statutory enactment that djd 
not address civil actions in tort should be used at all in a common law negligence 
cause of action. 
The Su reme Court of Utah, in the 1907 case Smith v. Mine & Smelter 
probing the rationale behind the use of nonprescriptive statutes and ordinances in 
negligence cases. Mrs. Smith sued for damages to her home and destruction of 
personal property caused by the negligence of a mining company.85 The mining 
company had violated a Salt Lake City ordinance prescribing how explosives 
should be stored in magazines and vaults, and prohibiting the storage of '"any 
78. 104 N.W. 208 (S.D. 1905). 
79. ld at 211 (citing Archibald R. Watson, Negligence, in 21 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 478-79 (DavidS. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1902)). 
80. Id at 209. 
81. Id at 211. 
82. Id. (citing Watson, supra note 79, at 478-79). 
83. See id 
84. 88 P. 683 (Utah 1907). 
85. !d. at 683. 
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explosive substance having an explosive power greater than that of ordinary 
gunpowder. "'86 Initially, the court contended that "whether a violation of a 
[statute] or ordinance constitutes negligence per se depends in a large measure 
upon the nature of the law or ordinance."87 Thus, as noted by the court, "[w]hen 
a standard of duty or care is fixed by law or ordinance, and such law or 
ordinance has reference to the safety of life, limb, or property, then, as a matter 
of necessity, a violation of such law or ordinance constitutes negligence."88 
Reasoning that it would make no sense to allow people who violated a safety 
standard contained in a statute or ordinance to argue that they conformed to the 
common law negligence standard of ordinary care and prudence, the Smith court 
opined: 
In any case the standard is usually defined as that degree of care that 
men of ordinary care and prudence usually exercise. But, when the 
standard is fixed by law or ordinance, how can one be heard to say that 
he exercised care in exceeding, or in refraining to comply with, the 
standard fixed? There is, in such cases, no comparison to be made. Care 
and prudence alone cannot excuse. Exceeding or disregarding the 
standard of care imposed must be held to be negligence, if it is anything. 
If it is held not to be such per se, it simply amounts to this: That it is for 
the jury to say whether, in violating a law or ordinance fixing a standard 
of care to be observed the law was carefully or negligently violated. The 
violation, thus in and of itself, would mean nothing, and one would be 
permitted to violate the law with impunity, provided the jury find it to 
have been carefully done.89 
The court's rationale, however, was deficient. It would certainly matter for 
purposes of criminal liability and penal policy whether or not a defendant 
violated the explosives ordinance. However, it might not make sense to hold a 
defendant negligent per se for all losses occasioned by an explosion stemming 
from the violation of the ordinance. The court acknowledged as much by 
limiting liability for a statutory or ordinance violation to proximately caused 
injuries and providing for defenses for an act of God or an unavoidable 
accident.90 Moreover, the court's reasoning is further deficient because it did not 
explain why the explosives ordinance was designed for the "safety of life, limb, 
or property."91 Was this an inference by the court based on the subject matter of 
the ordinance? Or, was it a conclusion about the intent of the Salt Lake City 
86. Id 
87. Id at 686. 
88. Id. 
89. Id 
90. See id at 686-87. 
91. Id. at 687. 
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Council in promulgating the explosives ordinance? The court leaves it to us to 
guess the answer. 
The 1906 opinion of Schutt v. Adair92 by the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
offered little more than a conclusory holding on whether negligence per se 
existed for violation of a statutory standard. In Schutt, a man fell down an open 
elevator shaft when he was on defendant's premises for the purpose of 
transacting business.93 The court explained that a state statute provided that 
"elevator shafts like those involved in this case [are] to be guarded and 
protected,'' but the court was "not prepared to admit that the statute" was 
applicable to the case at bar.94 On the contrary, without any explanation to 
support its conclusion, the court held that the elevator statute "was enacted for 
the protection of employes in warehouses, factories, and manufacturing. 
establishments, and it is doubtful whether, properly construed, it has any 
application to others."95 Yet, the court went on to assume the elevator statute's 
potential applicability to nonemployees like the plaintiff.96 Notwithstanding the 
statute's potential applicability, the court concluded that "statutes imposing such 
duties are not [to be] construed as to abrogate the ordinary [all or nothing] rules 
of contributory negligence, unless so worded as to leave no doubt that the 
Legislature intended to exclude the defense. "97 Therefore, according to the court, 
the trial judge properly instructed the jury, and the jury reached a justifiable 
verdict denying plaintiffs suit for negligence. 98 
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the 1909 case of Inland Steel Co. v. 
Yedinak,99 upheld a jury verdict in favor of a young boy who was seriously 
injured when a railroad car ran over his leg while he was working the graveyard 
shift at a steel mil1.100 A state statute prohibited ''the employment of a child 
under 14 years of age in any manufacturing establishment within [the] state.''101 
The supreme court construed the child employment prohibition statute as 
"designed to protect children against the hardships and perils resulting from 
overexertion''; as a "legislative interdiction [that] in effect declares that children 
within the prohibited age are not possessed of that judgment, discretion, and care 
requisite and necessary for their· own safety while engaged in a hazardous 
avocation"; and as making the steel company "chargeable with knowledge of the 
legal disabilities of children to engage in its service, and [required to] ascertain at 
92. 108' N.W. 811 (Minn. 1906), overruled by Suess v. Arrowhead Steel Prods~ Co., 230 
N.W. 125, 126-27 (Minn. 1930). 
93. Id at 811. 
94. ld at 812 (citing MINN. STAT.§ 24.2250 (1894)). 
95. Id 
96. See id 
97. Id 
98. ld, 
99. 87 N.E. 229 (Ind. 1909)~ 
100. Jd at 231--32, 236. 
101. ld at 232 (citing IND. CODE ANN.§. 8022 (1908)). 
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its peril that a boy employed in the operations of its factory, which has been 
classified by the Legislature as dangerous, is of the required age."102 The court 
characterized violation of the state statute as constituting "negligence per se"; 103 
however, the court really construed such violations of the statute as giving rise to 
absolute civil liability for the boy's personal injuries suffered on the job, having 
precluded the steel company from utilizing the defenses of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk.104 The court's statutory analysis fell short, 
though, by failing to answer why a nonprescriptive penal statute should displace 
the common law standard of ordinary care in a civil action for negligence and 
failing to explain why it construed the legislation as giving rise to absolute 
liability. . 
The 1910 case of Peterson v. Standard Oil Co. 105 involved a wrongful death 
action by the administrator of a domestic maid who died when she tried to light a 
fire of kerosene-soaked wood kindling.106 The Supreme Court of Oregon 
unanimously affirmed a trial court judgment based on negligence of the kerosene 
manufacturer who had mislabeled a drum of"Water White Kerosene," indicating 
the substance "would not bum under 120 degrees F·ahrenheit open-fire test."107 A 
state statute made it a misdemeanor to fail to label properly containers of 
petroleum distillates.108 The opinion for the supreme court started off with a 
curious discussion of the concept of judicial notice and its applicability to the 
"dangerous qualities" of distillates like kerosene.109 Concluding that it was 
proper to take judicial notice of the explosive qualities of kerosene, the supreme 
court attempted to bolster this conclusion by citing the Oregon petroleum 
labeling statute a violation of which the court interpreted as "constitut[ing] 
102. ld. at 233. 
103. !d. 
104. Id Still, the court conceded that "[a] causal connection between the unlawful 
employment and the injury .•. must be shown." !d. 
105. 106 P. 337 (Or. 1910), overruled by Nw. Door Co. v. Lewis Inv. Co., 180 P. 495, 504 
(Or. 1919). 
106. Id. at 338. 
107. Id at 337-38. 
108. Id. at 340 (quoting 1903 Or. Laws 103). The state act provided as follows: 
Benzole, benzene, gasoline, naphtha, and distillates, must be sold under their true 
names and grades, respectively, and such names and grades must be impressed, or 
otherwise plainly marked, upon the barrel, can, or vessel in which the same is sold, 
offered, or exposed for sale, respectively, or upon a label conspicuously and securely 
fastened thereto; and every barrel, can, or vessel of kerosene or coal oil that is offered or 
exposed for sale, shall be in like manner plainly marked or labeled with the word 
kerosene or coal oil, and with the degree, Fahrenheit, of fire test below which the same 
will not bum. Any person, firm, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this 
section shall be fined the sum of not less than on~ hundred dollars ($100) nor more than 
five hundred ($500), or be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six months~ 
1903 Or. Laws 103. 
109. Peterson, 106 P. at 339-40. 
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negligence per se" in a civil tort action.110 The supreme court cited a treatise on 
negl~gence law as wei~ as appellate opinions from other stab~s in support of.its 
negligence per se holdtng.11 The Supreme· Court of Oregon tn Peterson quoted 
.extensively from the treatise, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence by 
Seymour Thompson, as follows: 
This seems to introduce in this place a consideration of the antithesis of 
the proposition contained in the preceding paragraph the case where 
the Legislature of the state, or the council of a municipal corporation, 
having in view the promotion of the safety of th·e public ... commands 
or forbids the doing of a particular act Here the general conception of 
the courts, and the only one that is reconcilable with reason, is that the 
failure to do the act commanded, or the doing of the act prohibited, is 
negligence as mere matter of law, otherwise called negligence per se; 
and this, irrespective of all questions of the exercise of prudence, 
diligence, care, or skill; so that if it is the proximate cause of hurt or 
damage to another, and if that other is without contributory fault, the 
case is decided in his favor, and all that remains to be done is to assess 
his damages. 112 
The Peterson opinion followed up the treatise quotation with a quotation 
from the Supreme Court ofMinnesota in a case involving a druggist who sold 
poison without the label mandated by state statute: 
Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the 
duty is one imposed by the rule of the common law requiring the 
exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a 
statute designed for the protection of others. In either case the 
failure to perform the duty constitutes negligence, and renders the 
party liable for injuries resulting from it. The only difference is that 
in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be· determined upon 
common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it; so 
110. !d. at 340. 
111. Id (citing Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418,420-21 (1880); Browerv. Locke, 67 N.E. 1015, 
1017 (Ind. App. 1903); Diamond Block Coal Co. v. Cuthbertson, 67 N.E. 558, 559 (Ind. App. 
1903), aff'd, 73 N.E. 818 (Ind. 1905); Tobey v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 62 N.W. 761, 764 
(Iowa 1895); Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543~ 543-44 (Minn. 1889); 1 SEYMOUR D. 
THOiv1PSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN ALL RELATIONS§§ 1Q-11, at 12-13 
(1901)). 
112. Id (quoting THOMPSON, supra note 111, § 10, at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of 
negligence, or, in other words, negligence per se.113 
241 
At this juncture in its Peterson opinion, the Oregon court focused on the 
legal effect of violation of ~'a mere city ordinance'' in a civil tort suit because 
"[i]n such cases a different question presents itself, namely, whether, under the 
powers granted in a particular charter to prevent and regulate certain kinds of 
business, the city ordinance will have the effect to give a person injured a 
remedy" not available ''by a general statute upon the ... subject."114 According 
to the court, violation of a city ordinance would be "mere evidence of 
negligence";115 the court traced this conclusion back to an Oregon precedent that 
construed a violation by a railroad of a city speed ordinance as a breach of 
contract that "could give [no] right of action to a third party" in a tort suit.116 
Then, the Peterson court returned to the Thompson treatise for a final flourish: 
It is to be regretted that two or three authoritative courts have fallen into 
the aberration of holding that the violation of a statute, or municipal 
ordinance, enacted for the public safety, does not establish negligence 
per se, but is merely ... 'evidence of negligence' that is to say, 
competent but not conclusive evidence, to be submitted to the jury on 
the question of negligence or no negligence. It seems to have escaped 
the attention of the judges who have laid down this rule, that it has the 
effect of clothing common juries with the dispensing power the power 
to set aside acts of the Legislature a power exercised by the early 
. . 
kings of England, though its exercise was odious to our ancestors, so 
much so that the exercise of it disappeared with the Tudors. 117 
The reasoning of Peterson, however, upon closer examination, is too clever 
by half. First, the Oregon court assumed, without discussion, that the statutory 
misdemeanor criminal standard constituted an absolute liability criminal offense; 
yet, it is more probable that given constitutional norms of due process, a mens 
. . 
rea intent to violate the standard would be required in any criminal 
prosecution.118 Second, the court failed to discuss why the state legislature's 
113. Id. (quoting Osborne, 41 N.W. at 543-44) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114. ld. at 341. 
115. ld. 
116. Id (citing Beck v. Portland & V. Ry. Co., 34 P. 753, 755 (Or. 1893), overruled by 
Morgan v. Bross, 129 P. 118, 120 (Or. 1913)). 
117. Id (quoting THOMPSON, supra note 111, § 11, at 12-13) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
118. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (fmding 
that there is continuing constitutional importance to the mens rea principle and that this pri~ciple 
must be given constitutional effect based on the Due Process Clause); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 
86 (Nev. 2001) ("[A ]n individual who lacks the mental capacity to form the requisite intent or mens 
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criminal law enactment was mandated in a civil suit sounding in negligence 
involving potentially high compensatory damages. Third, the Peterson court 
incorrectly assumed that the common law standard of negligence was equivalent 
with a criminal statutory standard. Indeed, negligence involves circumstantial 
assessment of ordinary prudent care in individual, highly particularized contexts 
whereas the criminal statute is more absolutist in tone (but, nevertheless, 
softened in its potential impact on hapless violators by virtue of the tradition of 
prosecutorial discretion to forego a criminal indictment in extenuating and 
relatively minor cases). Fourth, the court's attempt to distinguish the tort law 
effect of statutory violations, on the one hand, and violations of city ordinances, 
. . 
on the other hand, is weak. Finally, the court makes the inapposite analogy of the 
ancient practice of kingly dispensing power to acts of the legislature with the 
traditional power of a common law jury in a civil action for negligence to 
consider the applicability of a nonprescriptive criminal statute to a tort suit for 
damages.119 
One final example of a judicial attempt to articulate and apply negligence 
per se principles during the 1880-1920 time frame is the 1913 United States 
Supreme Court opinion in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. 
McWhirter. 120 This case was a wrongful death action by the widow and 
administratrix of a railroad flagman who was killed while working on a freight 
train.121 The plaintiff alleged negligence on the railroad's part because of its 
violation of a federal statute which made it unlawful for interstate railroads to 
require their employees to remain on the job longer than sixteen consecutive 
hours.122 In reviewing a state court judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff 
against the railroad, which a state appellate court affirmed, Chief Justice White, 
writing for the Court, reversed the lower court's holding that the railroad's 
violation of the quasi-criminal federal statute on consecutive work hours was 
negligence per se that justified a verdict for the plaintiff.123 The Chief Justice 
opined for the Court: 
[T]hete would seem to be little doubt that [the state appellate court 
opinion] was intended to hold that the effect of the violation of the 
Hours of Service Act was to create an unconditional liability for all 
accidents happening during the period beyond the statutory time 
irrespective of proof showing a connection between the accident and the 
rea of a criminal offense cannot be convicted of that offense without violating the due process 
provisions of the United States and Nevada Constitutions."). 
119. Peterson, 106 P. at 341. 
120. 229 u.s. 265 (1913). 
121. ld. at 266. 
122. ld. at 266--67 (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2939, § 2, 34 Stat. 1415, 1416 (repealed 
1994)). 
123. Jd at 279-80, 283. 
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working over time. In other words, the ruling was that by operation of 
law the carrier is an insurer of the safety of all his employes while 
working beyond the statutory time.124 
243 
The Supreme Court in McWhirter disagreed with the construction of the 
federal railroad consecutive work hours statute given by the court below because 
the text of the statute gave no "support for the conclusion that it was the purpose 
of Congress in adopting it to subject carriers to the extreme liability of insurers" 
in a common law tort action for civil damages.125 The Court went on to reason: 
We say this because although the act carefully provides punishment for 
a violation of its provisions, nowhere does it intimate that there was a 
purpose to subject the carrier who allowed its employes to work beyond 
the statutory time to liability for all accidents happening during such 
period without reference to whether the accident was attributable to the 
act of working over time. And we think that where no such liability is 
expressed in the statute it cannot be supplied by implication. It requires 
no reasoning to demonstrate that the general rule is that where 
negligence is charged, to justify a recovery it must be shown that the 
alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the damage.126 
The Supreme Court's opinion in McWhirter is refreshing in that it looks to 
the text of the relevant statute for any indication that Congress prescribed tort 
law remedies for litigants in civil cases who could establish that a defendant 
violated the statute. The Court made the important distinction conceptually 
ignored by most courts that addressed the negligence per se doctrine during this 
early period of the doctrine's development that while the statute carefully 
prescribed quasi-criminal penalties for its breach, no language in the statute 
prescribed negligence as a matter of law where proof was adduced from a 
statutory violation. Still, the Court's reasoning was arguably too narrow in 
finding the statutory predicate to require proof of proximate causation 
. . 
connecting the tort injury and the law's violation. A broader reason for rejecting 
a negligence per se construction of a nonprescriptive federal statute would have 
been that the apparent purpose of Congress in passing the quasi-criminal statute 
was to authorize the government to seek appropriate quasi-criminal penalties 
against interstate railroads that kept their employees working more than sixteen 
straight hours, not to change the common law of negligence in civil actions by 
private litigants. 
124. !d. at 279. 
125. !d. at 280. 
126. !d. 
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III. MARTIN V. HERZOG AND LATER NEGLIGENCE PER SE JUDICIAL FLUBS 
A. Benjamin Cardozo; Martin v. Herzog, and the Nature of the Judicial 
Process 
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo's ''judicial opinions, first as a justice of the New 
York Court of Appeals (1916-1932) and then as an associate justice of the 
United States Supreme Court (1932-1938), especially in the law of torts, still 
find a place in the casebooks, often as living law" or "as classical expositions of 
the law of his day and model exemplars of the jurist's art."127 Indeed, "[w]hat 
distinguishes Cardozo from all but a handful of American judges of the past 
century were his extra-judicial writings on the law."128 It is a fair comment that 
''[p ]erhaps no other judge save Learned Hand has distilled so much judicial 
experience into his writings as did Cardozo.''129 Cardozo was chiefly concerned 
in these writings with the judicial process.130 
While some observers have noted the eclectic nature of Cardozo's judicial 
style, the most controversial insight is that he was, at heart, and as revealed in his 
judicial opinions, a Platonist.131 As fathomed in a 1939 law review article on 
Cardozo's legal philosoph , Edwin W. Patterson discerned that Cardozo sought 
Platonic 'essences,' overarching realities that exist as universals and possess an 
independent existence beyond our perception of them, that ideas are real, not 
127. Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, CARDOZO ON THE LAW 3, 4 
(1982). 
128. Id at 5. 
129. Id. Cardozo's extra-judicial writings "are disquisitions of a mature and experienced 
judge, and they are devoted both to understanding what a judge does and what he ought to do.'' I d. 
Compare those views with the modem case of United States Court of Appeals Judge, Richard A. 
Posner who has, in both quantity and quality, reflected on the role of American judges in his judicial 
and extra-judicial writings. See Robert F. Blomquist, Introduction to THE QUOTABLE JUDGE 
POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF RICHARD A. POSNER 
. . . . . . 
(Robert F. Blomquist ed., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with author); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUD,GES THINK (2008). 
130. See, e.g., BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-10 (1921), 
reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO 
BRAHE 107, 10~9 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947) (introducing Cardozo's discussion of the judicial 
process). For general background on Cardozo's judicial career, see GEORGE S. HELLMAN, 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO: ANlERICAN JUDGE (1940); IRVING LEHNIAN, THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGE 
CARDOZO ON THE COMiviON LAW (1942); JOSEPH P. POLLARD, MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO: A LmERAL 
MIND IN ACTION (Greenwood Press 1970) (1935); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO; A STUDY IN 
REPUTATION (1990) [hereinafter POSNER]; SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN 
CARDOZO, supra; Edwin W. Patterson, Cardozo's Philosophy of Law, 88 U~ PA~ L. REV. 71 (1939). 
131. See Barnes, supra note 127, at 7. 
132. Patterson, supra note 130, at 78-81. 
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merely symbolic contrivances" and that "Cardozo really did search for 
universals" in his jurisprudence.133 
Despite his universalist tendencies and Platonist approach to deciding cases 
as an appellate judge, Cardozo's famous book about judging reveals a less 
essentialist judicial philosophy. The public reaction to Cardozo's first book-
length opus, The Nature of the Judicial Process/34 published in 1921 the same 
year that it was delivered as a series of lectures at Yale "was extraordinary."135 
Thus, "[a]t one extreme [the book] had about it something of titillation: a serving 
[state] justice of one of the most highly reputed supreme benches in the country 
[the Court of Appeals of New York] was revealing all about how seven grave 
133. Barnes, supra note 127, at 7. But see Stanley C. Brubaker, The Moral Element in 
Cardozo's Jurisprudence, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1979) (arguing that Cardozo was a Platonist in 
the sense that the law should function to perfect society at large and individual citizens). I do not 
mean to label Cardozo in a pejorative sense with a Platonist label; I acknowledge that some more 
recent scholars offer a different picture of Cardozo. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the 
Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1461-73 (1999) (arguing that Justice Cardozo employed a pragmatic 
form of conceptualism in his decision making); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The 
Moral ofMacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1812-24 (1998) (articulating Justice Cardozo's 
belief that one could deploy the concept of duty in negligence law in a manner that was progressive 
and pragmatic without being an instrumentalist). Yet, other commentators have criticized Cardozo 
in ways that roughly relate to the abstraction and essentialism of a Platonistic approach to the law. 
Judge Richard A. Posner surveys a few of these criticisms in his book. See POSNER, supra note 130, 
at 11-18. According to Judge Posner, "Warren Seavey ... used to deride Cardozo's aphoristic 
style~" !d. at 1 L Grant Gilmore ~'tenns Cardozo 'mysterious ... almost mysticaL'" Id at 12 
(quoting GRANT G~MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 74 (1977)). Alfred Konefsky discerned 
an "elliptical, convoluted, and incomprehensible method" in Cardozo's opinion writing. Id at 15 
(citing Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny 
College Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 645 (1987)). John Noonan ''accuses Cardozo of deficiency in 
empathy, of suppressing critical facts, and of blindness to ... human issues.'' ld at 16 (citing JOHN 
T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLl'vlES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE 
AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 144 (1976)). G. Edward White argued that Cardozo's judicial opinions 
"'were at times close to being disingenuous"'; that his '"interpretation of his office ... juxtaposed a 
private craving for certainty and predictability against a public acceptance of the complexities of 
modem life'"; and that"[h]is method in writing opinions was 'to lay bare the competing elements in 
a case and then to make it appear as if their cJash had been resolved by someone other than 
himself"' ld at 18 (quoting G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROF~ES 
OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 208, 212 (3d ed. 2007)). Although Judge Posner himself has some 
good things to say about Cardozo's judicial method, he criticizes Cardozo for being, in certain 
opinions, a "rhetorician ... rather than [a] pragmatic policy analyst," and he argues that while 
"Cardozo is committed to a pragmatic approach ... he frequently is unable to make [it] operational 
so that its application can be predicted." ld at 53; cf BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL 
THEORY 29 (2004) (stating that while Cardozo often wrote "thoughtful and well-crafted opinions" 
and argued in his nonjudicial writings for ''the judicial role as a creative part of a process for making 
law serve social needs," nevertheless, ''[i]ronically, many of Cardozo's opinions, including some of 
his better-known decisions, read more like the work of a formalist than that of a legal realist, though 
this may only reflect Cardozo's bel~efs about how decisions should be presented"). 
134. CARDOZO, supra note 130, at 107. 
135. Barnes, supra note 127, at 9. 
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jurists handle the law."136 And, "[a]t the other extreme, there was a sense of 
triumph that a judge was finall . coming clean and demonstrating that what 
the facts of a case. 
The Nature of the Judicial Process famously was the first judicial 
explanation "to demonstrate in a systemic treatment how the judge was a 
legislator" in sometimes making law.138 Yet, Cardozo's book articulated 
limitations on judicial lawmaking as well. First, judges should not legislate, he 
argued, when ''the law is so clear that judges have no discretion.''139 Moreover, 
according to Cardozo's parlance, to determine wh·ether a gap in the law exists, 
judges should first attempt to find apt analogies, appropriate historical teachings, 
and community traditions.140 "If one (or more) of these methods when applied to 
the case indicates that there is a 'gap' requiring judicial legislation, then 
'sociology' will be the approach taken to fill it."141 For Cardozo, this ''method of 
sociology" to fill gaps in the law by judicial legislation should entail ·'justice, 
morals and social welfare, the mores of the day" as guideposts. 142 
Despite Cardozo's ambition to rationalize and essentialize the process of 
judging, a close reading of The Nature of the Judicial Process shows that judicial 
thinking entails open-textured and largely subjective considerations. Consider 
the following passages in his book. First, Cardozo acknowledges: 
All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, 
have been tugging at them inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, 
acquired convictions; and th·e resultant is an outlook on life, a 
conception of social needs, a sense in [William] James' phrase of ''the 
total push and pressure of the cosmos," which, when reasons are nicely 
balanced, must determine where choice shall fa11. 143 
Second, Cardozo admits that his judicial quest really boils down to 
''introspective searchings of the spirit": 
In this mental background every problem finds its setting. We may try to 
see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see 
them with any eyes except our own. To that test they are all brought a 
136. Id. 
137. Id at 10. 
138. !d. 
139. CARDOZO, supra note 130, at 160. 
140. ld. at 116~117. 
141. Barnes, supra note 127, at 12. 
142. CARDOZO, supra note 130, at 117. 
143. Id at 109-10. 
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f?rm of pl~ading or _an act o~ parliament, t~e wrongs of Raupers or the 
rights ofprtnces, a village ordinance or a nation's charter. 44 
. . 
247 
Third, Cardozo points out the deceptive certainty of judicial reliance on 
statutes as sources of law in adjudication. As the following excerpt demonstrates, 
the meaning of a statute is fraught with multiple questions of interpretation that 
are hard to answer when judging: 
Our first inquiry should ... be: Where does the judge find the law which 
he embodies in his judgment? There are times when the source is 
obvious. The rule that fits the case may be supplied by the constitution 
or by statute. If that is so, the judge looks no farther. The 
correspondence ascertained, his duty is to obey. The constitution 
overrides a statute, but a statute, if consistent with the constitution, 
overrides the law of judges. In this sense, judge-made law is secondary 
and subordinate to the law that is made by legislators. It is true that 
codes and statutes do not render the judge superfluous, nor his work 
perfunctory and mechanical. There ate gaps to be filled. There are 
doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There are hardships and wrongs to 
be mitigated if not avoided. Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were 
nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning which, however 
obscure and latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable pre-
existence in the legislator's mind. The process is, indeed, that at times, 
but it is often something more. The ascertainment of intention may be 
. . 
the least of a judge's troubles in ascribing meaning to a statute. "The 
fact is,'' says Gray ... ~'that the difficulties of so-called interpretation 
arise when the Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question 
which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges 
have to do is, not to detertnine what the legislature did mean on a point 
which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended 
on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present."145 
Fourth, speaking of the flux in the law, Cardozo opined: "For every 
tendency, one seems to see a counter-tendency; for every rule its antimony. 
144. Id at 110. This view is comparable to a later observation by Cardozo in his book, noting 
that after a judge exhausts "logic," "analogies," and ''philosophies," "[h ]istory or custom or social 
utility or some compelling sentiment of justice or sometimes perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension 
of the pervading spirit of our law, must come to the rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him where 
to go.'' Id at 122 (emphasis added). 
145. ld. at 110-11 (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF 1HE LAW 
173 (Macmillan Co. 1921) (1909)). 
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Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an 
endless 'becoming.' We are back with Heraclitus."146 
Fifth, Cardozo realized that symmetry and uniformity in a judge's 
interpretation of law ''may be bought at too high a price."147 He explained this 
concern as follows: 
Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity of 
oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must 
then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness 
or other elements of social welfare~ These may enjoin upon the judge the 
duty of drawing the line at another angle, of staking the path along new 
courses, of marking a new point of departure from which others who 
come after him will set out upon their journey.148 
And yet, "[i]f you ask [Cardozo] how he is to know when one interest 
outweighs another," he responds with utter subjectivity: "I can only answer that 
[a judge] must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience 
and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself."1Lt9 Moreover, a judge, 
according to Cardozo, "legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in 
the law. How far he may ~o without travelin~ beyond th~ walls of the inter~tices 
cannot be staked out for htm upon a chart"1 0 Rather, a Judge "must learn tt for 
himself as he gains the sense of fitness and proportion that comes with years of 
habitude in the practice of an art."151 So, "[ e ]ven within the gaps" of the evolving 
law in a particular field, "restrictions not easy to define, but felt, however 
impalpable they may be . .. h_edge and circumscribe [a judge's] action."152 
Therefore, "[ t ]he law which is the resulting product" of this judicial search is, in 
Cardozo's words, ''not found, but made. The process, b,eing legislative, demands 
the legislator's wisdom.,"153 Perhaps a useful coda in Cardozo's discussion of the 
judge as a cabined legislator is his admiring quotation of the first article of the 
Swiss Civil Code of 1907: 
The statute ... governs all matters within the letter or the spirit of any of 
its mandates. In default of an applicable statute, the judge is to 
146. !d. at 115-16. 
147. Id at 154. 
148. Id 
149. Id. 
150. Id 
151. !d. 
152. ld. (emphasis added). 
153. ld. at 155. Cardozo hedges this broad, subjective view of a judge's law-finding by 
,claiming that "[ o ]bscurity of statute_ or of precedent or of customs or of morals" are "occasional and 
relatively rare" and should not "blind Oudges '] eyes to the. innumerable instances where there is 
neither obscurity nor collision nor opportunity for diverse judgment." Id at 159-60. 
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pronounce judgment according to the customary law, and in default of a 
custom according to the rules which he would establish if he were to 
assume the part of a legislator. He is to draw his inspiration, however, 
from the solutions consecrated by the doctrine of the learned and the 
jurisprudence of the courts .... 154 
249 
Benjamin Cardozo was a judge on New York's top appellate court for a 
mere seven years when he published The Nature of the Judicial Process in 
1921.155 Just the year before, in 1920, Cardozo authored the majority opinion for 
the Court of Appeals of New York in Martin v. Herzog. 156 Nowhere in his book, 
however, does he mention the Martin opinion.157 Yet; there was a profound 
disconnect between Cardozo's easygoing subjectivity articulated in his book and 
his rigid tendencies in Martin, where he famously asserted the universal bromide 
that "unexcused omission of the statuto . signals is more than some evidence of 
the negligence per se approach159 and went on to recognize "relaxation" of the 
doctrine "where the one who complains of the omission is not a member of the 
class for whose protection the safeguard is designed"160 and ~'where the 
safeguard is prescribed by local ordinance, and not by statute.''161 But Cardozo 
would brook no flexibility in the case at bar, which involved a collision between 
an automobile and a buggy where the buggy failed to travel with lights at night 
in violation of a state highway statute.162 Cardozo reasoned: 
Lights are intended for the guidance and protection of other travelers on 
the highway. By the very terms of the hypothesis, to omit, willfully or 
heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of 
another ... is to fall short of the standard of diligence to which those 
who live in organized society are under a duty to confonn.163 
In Cardozo's view, the court should not have allowed the jurors to determine 
under all the facts and circumstances leading up to the roadway accident whether 
154. Id. at 164 (quoting Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, 
art. 1 (Switz.), translated in THE SWISS CIVIL CODE OF DECENIBER 10, 1907 (Robert P. Shick trans., 
Boston Book Company 1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cardozo's translation appears to 
be unique but does not differ in substance from the Shick translation. 
155. See ANDREWL. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 129, 199 (1998). 
156. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920). 
157. See CARDOZO, supra note 130. 
158. Martin, 126 N.E. at 815. 
159. See id. 
160. ld. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. at 814-16. 
163. Id. at 815 (internal citations omitted). 
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the buggy driver was at fault in failing to having lights on his buggy.164 He 
reasoned as follows: 
In the case at hand, we have an instance of the admitted violation of 
a statute intended for the protection of travelers on the highway .... Yet 
the jurors were instructed in effect that they were at liberty in their 
discretion to treat the omission of lights either as innocent or as 
culpable. They were allowed to "consider the default as lightly or 
gravely" as they would .... They might as well have been told that they 
could use-a like discretion in holding a master at fault for the omission 
of a safety appliance prescribed by positive law for the protection of a 
workman. Jurors have no dispensing power, by which they may relax 
the duty that one traveler on the highway owes under the statute to 
another. It is error to tell them that they have. The omission of these 
lights was a wrong, and, being wholly unexcused, was also a negligent 
wrong. No license should have been conceded to the triers of the facts to 
find it anything else.165 
In closing his opinion in Martin, Cardozo noted that "causal connection 
between the negligence and the injury" is required in negligence cases, but that 
given "evidence of a collision occurring more than an hour after sundown 
between a car and an unseen buggy, proceeding without lights, is evidence from 
which a causal connection may be inferred between the collision and the lack of 
signals. "166 
For a number of reasons, Cardozo's negligence per se reasoning in Martin v. 
Herzog was deficient and against his theoretical musings on the judicial process 
in his eponymous book. In the first place there was no "gap" in the law for the 
Court of Appeals of New York to fill. A common law jury was doing its 
traditional function of applying the appropriate standard of care to the contextual 
facts in the case. The court should have allowed the jury to weigh the fact that 
the buggy driver was driving without lights (in violation of a quasi-criminal 
traffic statute that made no reference to its binding applicability in a civil suit for 
damages) with the fact of the automobile driver's lack of care ''in swerving from 
the center of the road''167 into the lane of the oncoming buggy, which happened 
also to violate a general state quasi-criminal highway safety statute.168 Cardozo's 
opinion, however, aggressively usurped the jury's sifting and balancing of the 
evidence adduced at trial and improperly denigrated the automobile driver's 
164. See id. 
165. ld. (internal citations omitted). 
166. I d. at :816. 
167. Jd. 
168. ld at 814 (citing N.Y. HIGH. LAW§§ 286(3), 332 (McKinney 1917)). 
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violation of the statutory command to stay right of the road center. It was 
illogical, in this regard, for Cardozo to contend that the automobile driver "may 
have been negligent in swerving from the center of the road; but he did not run 
into the buggy purposely, nor was h~ driving while intox~cated, nor was h~ goin~ 
at such a reckless speed that wamtng would of necessity have been futtle."1 
The aforementioned contingencies were immaterial to the automobile driver's 
lack of due care in failing to stay in his own lane purposely running into the 
buggy would have been an intentional tort; not purposely running into the 
oncoming buggy was of no legal consequence in a tort suit sounding in 
negligence; not being intoxicated was no excuse for forgiving swerving into the 
lane of oncoming traffic; and not speeding was no excuse for going into the other 
lane.170 
In the second place, Cardozo's opinion in Martin abrogated, in the name of 
negligence per se, the jury's implicit finding that the buggy driver's violation of 
the general highway statute prescribing a running li~ht was not the proximate 
cause of the automobile colliding with the buggy. 71 Judge Hogan cogently 
explained in his dissent: 
I cannot concur that we may infer that the absence of a light on the front 
of the [buggy] was not only the cause, but the proximate cause, of the 
accident. Upon the evidence adduced upon the trial and the credence 
attached to the same [by the jury], the fact has been determined that the 
accident would have been avoided, had the defendant been upon his side 
of the road, or attentive to where he was driving along a public highway, 
or had he been driving slowly, used his sense of sight, and observed 
plaintiff and her intestate as he approached them; they being visible at 
the time . . . . The jury found that the accident happened as claimed by 
the plaintiff and her witnesses, and we cannot surmise or infer that the 
accident would not have happened, had a light been located on the 
[buggy]. 112 
In the third place, Cardozo's opinion in Martin fails to explicitly interpret 
the general highway statute requiring running lights on vehicles; instead, he 
simply assumes by wooden and unpragmatic reasoning that violation of any 
statute "is more than some evidence of negligence," but ''is negligence in 
169. Id at 816. 
170. As the dissenting opinion of Judge Hogan pointed out, moreover, the majority opinion in 
Martin discounted and overlooked evidence that the automobile driver who swerved into the 
buggy's lane was speeding, that the evening of the accident was not dark, and that the road was lit 
up by moonlight, electric lights along the highway, and by the defendant's automobile.Jd at 817-
18 (Hogan, J., dissenting). 
171. See id. at 816 (majority opinion). 
172. !d. at 820 (Hogan, J., dissenting). 
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itself."173 "Substituting form and phrases for substance," in the dissent's turn of 
phrase/74 undermines Cardozo's quest, as stated in The Nature of the Judicial 
Process, for serious and thoughtful statutory construction and interpretation by 
judges.175 
Fourth, Cardozo's negligence per se analysis in Martin flies in the face of 
his call in The Nature of the Judicial Process for judicial balancing of 
"uniformity," "symmetry," and "certainty" in law with ''the social interest served 
by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare."176 
B. 1921-2000 
During the eighty-year period that followed Cardozo's opinion in Martin v. 
Herzog, state and federal court opinions mentioned negligence per se principles 
in over 10,000 opinions.177 Many of these judicial opinions mechanically intoned 
black letter law on the nature and relevance of nonprescriptive statutory 
provisions in civil actions for negligence. My aim in discussing these opinions is 
to select a few prominent examples of the problematic corpus of negligence per 
se analysis while pointing out the rare o;inions that rise above th~ mud~le. . 
In the 1925 case of Day v. Pauly,17 the Supreme Court ofWtsconstn apphed 
negligence per se principles to hold an injured motorist contributorily negligent 
for violating a statute by "cut[ ting] a corner" at an intersection.179 As a result, 
under the prevailing ali-or-nothing liability regime then in place, the court denied 
the plaintiff recovery for injuries despite the negligence by the defendant 
motorist. 180 
In the 1939 case of Fairchild v. Dean,181 the Supreme Court of Washington 
rigidly interpreted a criminal statute, which penalized motorists for passing 
173. Id at 815 (majority opinion). 
174. Id at 820 (Hogan, J., dissenting). But cf WHITE, supra note 133, at 234-35 (noting that 
Judge Learned Hand's theory of statutory interpretation focused on a judge "determining the 
primary purposes of a statute" but "required judges to maintain the delicate balance between 
creativity and restraint that he associated with wisdom in the judiciary''). Cardozo's approach in 
Martin was more akin to tne statutory interpretation philosophy of California Supreme Court Justice 
Roger Traynor involving a "symbiotic relationship" between legislatures and courts. See id at 255. 
175. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
176. CARDOZO, supra note 130, at 154. 
177. Based on a Westlaw search in the "all cases" database with a query ''negligence per se'' 
between February 20, 1920 and February 20, 2000 (search conducted on Nov. 2, 2009). 
178. 202 N.W. 363 (Wis. 1925). 
179. Id at 364-65. 
180. See id at 365--66. 
181. 86 P.2d 271 (Wash. 1939). But see Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939) 
(illustrating judicial interpretation to a:void a fmding of an unexcused statutory violation). In Ted/a, 
the plaintiff was walking with his back to o~coming traffic in violation of a statute mandating 
pedestrians to walk facing oncoming traffic. Id at 988 (citing N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 85(6) 
(Baldwin 1938)). The court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff should be barred 
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without a clear view of more than 200 yards, to reverse the trial court's finding 
that the defendant motorist was not at fault. 182 The motorist had passed a truck 
on a strange highway on a foggy morning and collided with a car that could not 
be seen coming around a curve.183 
In the 1948 case of Garbacz v. Grand Trunk Western Railway Co.,184 the 
Supreme Court of Michigan mechanically utilized negligence per se to foreclose 
a tractor-trailer driver from having a jury resolve his negligence claim against a 
railroad.185 The case involved a nighttime railroad crossing accident, which the 
driver claimed was caused by ''the blinker warning signals at the crossing ... not 
working" and "no bells or whistles sound[ing]," lulliny him to believe that he 
could safely cross the tracks at a reduced rate of speed. 86 The case appeared to 
involve substantial negligence by the railroad in maintaining deficient crossing 
signals and the train engineer's failure to sound a whistle or bell.187 However, the 
court deemed the truck driver's objectively reasonable decision to slow down, 
rather than stop, at the crossing to be negligence per se in light of a state statute 
requiring heavy trucks to "'com[e] to a full stop within 50 feet but not less than 
10 feet from . . . railroad tracks '·"188 and the violation of his state carrier 
certificate, which also required the driver to come to a complete stop at railroad 
crossings.189 Finding negligence per se in the driver's violations of the statutes, 
the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the lower court's directed verdict for the 
railroad because of the contributory negligence rule then in effect.190 
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify 
negligence per se principles in Federal Employment Liability Act cases 
involving railroad workers in 0 'Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway 
Co.191 Justice Jackson's majority opinion, however, candidly unearthed 
numerous doctrinal deficiencies concerning negligence per se.192 First, Jackson 
observed that an overarching problem could be "traceable to the diversity of 
. . . . . judicial opinion concemin~ the consequences attributed in negligence actions to 
the violation of a statute." 93 Second, he noted that "[b ]reach of certain statutes 
from recovery because he was contributorily negligent per se. ld at 991. The court reached its 
conclusion, in part, by concluding that it would have been more dangerous for the plaintiff to have 
complied with the statute than to violate it and that the statute at issue was a mere "rule of the road.'' 
Id at 991. 
182. Fairchild, 86 P.2d at 272-73. 
183. Id. at 271-72. 
184. 34 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1948). 
185. !d. at 533. 
186. Id at 532. 
187. See id 
188. Id (quoting Act No. 191, 1941 Mich. Pub. Acts 287). 
189. Id at 532-33. 
190. Id. at 533 (citing Benaway v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 295 N.W. 536, 538 (Mich. 1941)). 
191. 338 U.S~ 384 (1949). 
192. See id. at 389-93. 
193. !d. at 389. 
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in various jurisdictions will be regarded as some evidence of negligence, to be 
weighed by the jury along with the facts."194 Third, Jackson asserted that "[a]t 
other times or places, or under other statutes, a violation may be 'prima facie' or 
'presumptive' evidence of negligence which [the opposing party] must meet or 
overcome."
195 Fourth, confusion was exacerbated because "[c]ourts sometimes 
talk of [statutory violations] in terms of res ipsa loquitur or treat violations as 
negligence per se."196 Fifth, as Jackson went on to point out, "[i]t is not 
uncommon that within the same jurisdiction the rule is different as to different 
statutes."197 Sixth, Jackson neatly summarized the chaotic state of American 
negligence per se principles by contending that "usually, unless the statute sets 
up a special cause of action for its breach, a violation becomes an ingredient, of 
l . h . a . . h t . . if z· ,198 greater or esser wezg t, zn eterm1n1ng t e u tzmate questzon o neg zgence. 
Yet, in spite of Justice Jackson's yeoman job in identifying the aforementioned 
inconsistencies in negligence per se doctrine, the Court's holding in the case199 
instantiated a seventh doctrinal deficiency of negligence per se law. That is, in 
some cases (incompletely theorized as "absolute'' liability) the violation of a 
statute '"is not excused by any showing of care however assiduous. '"200 This 
principle is confusingly akin to negligence per se without excuses. 
The diverging opinions of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the 1954 case, 
Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,201 illustrate the vague and indetenninate nature of the 
classic two-part inquiry used by judges to decide the propriety of adopting a 
quasi-criminal statute as the standard of care in a negligence case. Under this 
inquiry, "[t]he judge must examine the statute in order to determine ... whether 
the statute was designed to protect against the type of harm suffered by the 
plaintiff, and whether the class of persons designed to be protected by the statute 
includes the plaintiff. "202 As noted by one recent treatise on torts, "[ t ]his [two-
step] determination is wholly for the judge to make and often is no easy task., 
investing the judge with great discretion~ "203 Indeed, in Ney, a state statute 
194. Id at 390 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 283 (1894); Hayes v. 
Mich. Cent. R. Co., 111 U.S. 228, 240 (1884)). 
195. Id 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. (emphasis added). 
199. "[T]o equip a car with a coupler which broke . . . was a violation of the [Safety 
Appliance] Act, which rendered defendant liable ... , and ... neither evidence of negligence nor of 
diligence of care was to be considered on the question of ... liability." ld. at 394. 
200. Id at 390-91 (quoting Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass·'n, 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938)). 
201. 117 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. 1954). 
202. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 6.02, at 95 (2d ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING TORTS SECOND EDITION] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 286 (1965)). 
203. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Traynor once noted that "[t]he decision as to what the civil 
standard should be still rests with the co~ and the standard formulated by a legislative body in a 
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rendered unlawful leaving one's keys in the ignition of an unattended vehicle?04 
The Ney majority found that the statute provided a negligence per se standard 
when a plaintiffs automobile was hit b~ a taxi after it had been stol~n by a third 
party.2° Contrary to the statute, the taxi had been left unattended with the motor 
running and the key in the ignition.206 The Ney majority looked to assorted 
provisions of the Illinois statute to conclude that the state legislature, through the 
key-removal command, intended to protect the public from harm to their 
property and person.207 According to the opinion for the court, there was no 
indication that the legislature had intended to make a legal distinction between 
harm triggered by a criminal act, like stealing a car, and other forms of harm~208 
The diss.ent in Ney interpreted the key-in-the-ignition statute in a way that was 
diametrically opposed to the majority's interpretation, concluding that there was 
no direct indication that the legislature had contemplated harm ·caused by a car 
thief in contradistinction to injury occasioned by negligent or inadvertent 
operation of the vehicle.209 Therefore, the dissent argued it was inappropriate for 
the judiciary to infer that the statute was intended to prevent the accident which 
took place?10 . 
Wenninger v. United States,211 a 1964 wrongful death case involving the 
violation by air traffic controllers of a federal administrative rule, provides 
another prominent example of the exercise of improvident judicial discretion in 
interpreting the ambiguous p.urpose of a nonprescriptive statutory or 
administrative rule. The plaintiffs decedent was flying his private airplane when 
turbulence, caused by a military aircraft operating in a zone where military 
planes were prohibited, caused him to crash.212 The federal district court held 
. . 
that an air traffic control regulation that barred military aircraft from flying in a 
civilian area did not result in negligence per se because the apparent purpose of 
the regulation was not to protect civilian flyers but only to increase the efficiency 
of Air Force flights.213 However, the purpose of a federal air traffic control 
system that seeks to separate relatively high-powered and freewheeling military 
aircraft from less powerful and mobile private aircraft would seem to be the 
protection of both civilian and military air travelers. 
police regulation or criminal statute becomes the standard to determine civil liability only because 
the court accepts it.'' Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1943). 
204. 117 N.E.2d at 76. 
205. Id at 76, 78. 
206. Id. at 76. 
207. Id at 77-78. 
208. !d. 
209. ld. at 81 (Hershey, J., dissenting) .. 
210. Id 
. . 
211. 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), a.ff'd, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir~ 1965) (per curiam). 
212. I d. at 508. 
213. Id at 511. 
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In Hanrahan v. McClatchy,214 a federal trial court appears to have confused 
the distinction between the purposes of the negligence per se doctrine to 
protect a class of people and to prevent a particular type of injury and the 
. . . 
proximate cause nexus requirement between a statutory violation and a 
plaintiffs injury.215 The plaintiff, "a passenger in an automobile which failed to 
yield the right of way at a stop intersection," sought tort damages against the 
driver of the other automobile involved in the collision, which was in the wrong 
lane on a two-way street.216 The plaintiff argued that because the driver of the 
other car had violated a provision of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, the court 
sho~d hold that driver to be nefligent p~r se.217 The court ~ejected the plaintiff's 
negligence per se argument.21 Accordtng to the reasoning of the court, the 
purpose and interests that the Pennsylvania legislature intended to protect by 
requiring motor vehicles to stay on the right side of a two-way street were not 
applicable to an intersection accident.219 Moreover, according to the court, the 
violation of the right lane statute by the other motorist was not the immediate 
cause of the intersection accident.220 Accordingly, the jury was required to weigh 
the intent of the statute and proceed upon the evidence to be presented at trial to 
make a determination of negligenc.e.22 
Decisions like Hanrahan make a jury's job more difficult than it already is 
in a common law negligence suit. It might be proper for a jury to consider the 
statutory violation as evidence of negligence, which is weighed in the balance of 
both drivers' ostensible violations of motor vehicle rules one prohibiting 
driving on the wrong side of the road, the other prohibiting running stop signs-
but it is manifestly not the province of a jury to weigh the intent of a statute.222 
We should nevertheless be sympathetic with the court in trying valiantl~ to sort 
out the ambiguous muddle of negligence per se principles in hard cases. 2 3 
214. 384 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a.ff'd, 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974). 
215. See id at 18-21. 
216.Jd. at 17. 
217.Jd at 17-18. 
218.Jd at 21. 
219.ld. at 19. 
220.Id at 21. 
221. See id. 
222. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 6.02, at 85 (3d ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION] (noting that a decision about the intent of a 
statute "is wholly for the judge to make"). 
223. But compare Hanrahan to the simpler case of Ward v. McDan Dav Leasing Corp., 340 F. 
Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 683 (3d. Cir. 1973), where the, negligence per se analysis 
was indubitably correct. In that wrongful death action, a steel shipper and manufacturer violated a 
state statute by allowing a piece of steel to fall off a truck onto a public highway. !d. at 89, 96. The 
presenc.e of the steel beam caused an accident that resulted in the decedent's death. Id at 88. The 
court gave judgment to the plaintiff, reasoning that the statute was designed to protect other users of 
the highway from accidents occasioned by dislodged foreign objects in the road./d at 96. 
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The conflict between judicial opinions in the 1980 Louisiana case, McCloud 
v. Parish of Jefferson,224 is emblematic of a further source of negligence per se 
doctrinal confusion the public duty exception?25 The plaintiffs in McCloud 
sued a parish ''for damag.es to themselv.es and their property" resulting from the 
local government's failure to maintain an effective drainage system as mandated 
by a Louisiana statute.226 The appellate -court majority reversed the trial court's 
dismissal of the suit and remanded the case for further trial court. proceedings?27 
The dissent argued that the lower court's decision should have been affirmed 
be,cause the plaintiffs had not alleged that the parish had breached a duty that it 
owed to them.228 The dissent contended that legislative enactments involved in 
the case at bar, which created departments of government and granted them 
essential powers, are not intended ''to protect the interests of any [one] individual 
except as they secure to all members of the community the enjoyment of rights 
and privileges to which they are entitled only as members of the public."229 
Accordingly, as pressed by the dissent, governmental "[n]eglect in the 
performance of such [public statutory] requirements [should not] 
create[] ·~ · .. civil liability to individuals."230 
The diss.ent in McCloud was motivated by analogous tort policy 
considerations in nonstatutory common law negligence actions a ainst 
yet, if the Louisiana legislature commanded the Parish of Jefferson to maintain 
properly a public drainage system, it would appear that the dissent in McCloud 
unduly minimized the plausible implicit legislative intent to protect parish 
residents from flooding caused by a deficient public drainage system. 
The 1990 California case of Seiger v. Steven Brothers, Inc. 232 involved 
another confusing nuance of negligence per se statutory or ordinance 
requirements of nearby property owners to maintain a sidewalk in a condition 
that will not endanger pedestrians.233 Seiger involved a city ordinance that 
224. 383 So. 2d 477 (La. CLApp. 1980). 
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965) ("The court will not adopt as the 
standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an 
administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively ... to impose upon the actor the 
performance of a service which the state. or any subdivision of it undertakes to give the public."). 
226. McCloud, 383 So. 2d at 478. 
227. !d. at 479. 
228. Id at 484 (Chehardy, J., dissenting). 
229. Id (quoting Steitz v. City of Beacon, 64 N.E.2d 704, 706 (N.Y. 1945)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
230. Id (quoting Steitz; 64 N.E.2d at 706) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
231. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that 
with regard to police and frre protection, the government owes a duty to the public at large, not to 
any particular individU;al; and therefore, the city was not liable in common law negligence for 
failing to protect a young woman from a jilted suitor who ultimately .carried out his threats). 
232. 272 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1990). 
233. Id at 545-46. 
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provided that '"[n]o person shall fail, refuse or neglect to keep the sidewalk in 
front of his house, place of business or premises in a clean and wholesome 
condition. "'234 The plaintiff sli~Eed on dog excrement on the sidewalk outside of 
a nursery and hardware store. 5 She had previously undergone a hi implant, 
judge instructed that the defendant store should be found negligent per se if the 
jury found that the defendant violated the ordinance.237 Accordingly, the trial 
court entered judgment on a jury verdict of over $400,000 for the plaintiff?38 On 
appeal, the California intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the 
ordinance violation did not give rise to negligence per se: 
[B]ecause the municipality has the primary responsibility for 
maintaining the public sidewalks, statutes and ordinances which require 
the abutting landowner to maintain the sidewalk in a condition that will 
not endanger pedestrians have ... been interpreted not to create a 
standard of care toward pedestrians but only a liability of the owner to 
the municipality. 239 
The Seiger appellate court rendered a fair and appropriate decision. But a 
better rationale would have been one premised on fair proportionality between 
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries coupled with traditionally 
posited lower status of a municipal ordinance violation as compared to a 
violation of a state statute.240 The trial court in Seiger deserves sympathetic 
understanding, however, because a mechanical application of the two-part 
purpose, which protects a class of persons from a particular type of harm, 
appears, at first blush, to justify an instruction of negligence per se for violating 
the ordinance. 
A 1999 Alaska case, Cable v. Shefchik,241 demonstrates recurrent judicial 
confusion about negligence per se. A worker, who "severely injured his right 
hand when it was caught in the rotating ... blade of a concrete pump," sued the 
pump owner for negligence. 242 The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict 
for the defendant, finding that the defendant's negligence ''was not the legal 
cause of' the plaintiffs injuries?43 The Supreme Court of Alaska, however, 
234. ld. at 546 (quoting L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE§ 41.46 (1964)). 
235. ld. 
236.Id 
237. Id 
238. Id 
239. Id at 547. 
240. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS 98 (3d ed. 2005). 
241. 985 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1999). 
242. !d. at 475. 
243. !d. 
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reversed and remanded the action, holding that the trial court judge had ab,used 
his discretion when he declined to instruct the jury on negligence per se.244 As 
reasoned by the supreme court, the Alaska General Safety Code provisions for 
industrial machinery "were not 'so obscure, oblique, or irrational' that, as a 
matter of law, they could not provide an adequate standard of care."245 The court 
ordered that "[t]he negligence per se instruction at the new trial should include" 
language that the machine owner would be "negligent only if he committed an 
unexcused violation of' the Alaska General Safety Code.246 One wonders, 
however, how a jury would be able to fathom better clarity from the safety code 
provisions than the trial court judge. 
The 2000 Wisconsin case, Totsky v. Riteway Bus Service, Inc.,247 illustrates 
judicial disarray over "excused violations'' of statutes used as negligence per se 
standards. A motorist, whose car was struck by a school bus that skidded on ice 
through a stop sign, sued the bus driver, among others, claiming negligence per 
se for violating the stop sign statute.248 After the jury found neither motorist 
negligent, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the plaintiff because of the 
bus ?ri':er's negligence per se in viol~tin~ the sto~-sign st~tute and the lack of 
application of the emergency doctrine. 49 The Intennedtate appellate court 
reversed, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the appellate court's 
decision.250 According to the majority opinion of the state supreme court, the 
emergency doctrine applied to excuse the bus driver's violation of the stop-sign 
statute.251 The dissent, however, argued that the plain langua e of the stop-sign 
to warp the concept of an excused emergency to allow a motorist to avoid civil 
liability for violating a statute simply because the road at the intersection was 
• Icy. 
A 2000 Washington case, Templeton v. Daffern (Estate of Templeton),253 
showcases unclear negligence per se reasoning by the appellate court. The estate 
of a minor sued the social hosts of a party for negligence.254 The minor was 
involved in a fatal car crash after the party, at which he had consumed alcohol 
obtained elsewhere?55 The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's 
244. Id. at 479. 
245. Id. at 478 (quoting Osborne v. Russell, 669 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1983)). 
246. Id. at 479. 
247. 607 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 2000). 
248. !d. at 640 41. 
249. Id at 642. 
250. Id at 642, 652. 
251. Id at 649. 
252. ld at 657 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A 
(1965)). 
253. 990 P.2d 968 (Wash. Ct App~ 2000). 
254. I d. at 970. 
255. Id. 
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granting of the social hosts' motion for summary judgment.256 In spite of the 
defendants' breach of a state statutory duty not to allow a minor to consume 
alcohol on their premises, the court reasoned that a common law duty in 
Washington did not exist to prevent a minor from consuming alcohol furnished 
by someone other than the social hosts.257 Obviously, the appellate court was 
-concerned about the limited duty that most courts have adopted for social host 
liability for hosts who serve guests alcohol on their premises.258 Yet, the 
fundamental rationale of negligence per se is that if a specific statutory standard 
of care exists, it should be judicially substituted for the general common law 
negligence standard. 259 
C. 2001-2006 
We now turn to recent negligence per se cases adjudicated from 2001 to 
2006. The commentary that follows discusses several judicial opinions. Alas, 
many American courts continue to struggle with negligence per se principles and 
to entangle the resolution of nonprescriptive statutory problems with confusing 
and unsatisfactory analysis. 
1. 2001 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Claypool v. Hibberd,260 affinned a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, Furnas County, 
Nebraska, and two sheriff's deputies?61 A mother sued the defendants for the 
wrongful death of her son, whom the defendants had arrested and released the 
night before he committed suicide, alleging that the county officials' failure to 
notify the son's parents violated the parental notification provision of a state 
temporary-custody statute.262 As a result, the mother did not know that her son, 
who was in a depressed, post-arrest state of mind, was alone in her house.263 The 
supreme court held that the state statute did not create a duty for the defendants 
to notify the parents of their son;s arrest.264 A more convincing rationale, 
however, would have focused on a lack of proximate causation. 
256. Id at 975-76. 
257. Id. at 973-75. 
258. See JOHNSON, supra note 240, at 188. 
259. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.01, at 84. 
260. 626 N.W.2d 539 (Neb. 2001 ). 
261. ld. at 541-42, 549. 
262. !d. at 541-44. 
263. See id. at 542-43. 
264. Id at 546. 
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The Supreme Court of Nevada issued divergent opinions in Vega v. Eastern 
Courtyard Associates.265 After a patron of a medical facility suffered personal 
injuries when she slipped and fell on a ramJ? leading to the main entrance of a 
building, she sued the facility for negligence.266 The trial court entered judgment 
on a jury verdict for the defendant after refusing to issue jury instructions that the 
fact that the ramp's slope exceeded the county's Uniform Building Code (UBC) 
was negligence per se.267 A majority of the supreme court reversed and 
remanded the action, holding that a violation of a building code provision 
adopted by county ordinance constituted negligence per se if the plaintiff 
?~longed to the class of p~rsons the ~rdinance was intende~ to ~rotect a?d the 
InJury was the sort the ordtnance was Intended to protect agatnst. 68 The dtssent, 
however, asserted that the trial court had properly instructed the jury that it could 
-consider the UPC violation as evidence ofnegligence.269 
The disagreement by the dissent, of course, focused on the view that 
"accord[ s] negligence per se ... treatment to violations of legislative enactments 
passed by a prestigious body, such as a state legislature, but treat[s] violations of 
laws or regulations emanating from lower tribunals, such as a city council or 
administrative agency [or county], as simply evidence of negligence.''270 This 
aspect of negligence per se jurisprudence, however, makes little sense when one 
considers that city councils, counties, and administrative agencies enjoy mixtures 
of prestigious, constitutionally-specified, and statutorily-delegated governmental 
powers to promulgate various important safety standards.271 
2. 2002 
In Dalmer v. State,272 the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the trial 
-court's grant of ajud~ment as a matter of law for a state social servi~es center 
and a state employee. 73 In Dalmer, the parents of a runaway son clatmed that 
the state defendants, by violating the state Juvenile Proceedings Act, were 
negligent per se in taking and retaining custody ofthe boy.274 The supreme court 
interpreted the state statute as providing no civil remedy for violation of the 
statute in this case?75 The judicial result was affected by the public duty 
265. 24 P.3d 219 (Nev. 2001). 
266. !d. at 220. 
267. Id at 220-21. 
268. Id at 222. 
269. Id. at223 (Maupin, J., dissenting). 
270. JOHNSON, supra note 240, at 98 (emphasis omitted). 
271. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 50 (2004); 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal 
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 404 (2000). 
272. 811 A.2d 1214 (Vt. 2002). 
273. Id. at 1217, 1227. 
274. !d. at 1219. 
275. ld at 1222 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 286(d) (196~)). 
262 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 61: 221 
doctrine, which makes courts hesitant to hold governmental litigants negligent 
per se when administering statutes for the benefit of the public at large.276 
The Su reme Court of Ohio, in Wallace v. Ohio Department of 
?rought by ~ersons inj.ur:d in a fireworks store and th~ estates of persons kill~d 
tn the store. 78 The platnttffs alleged that the state offictal was neghgent per se tn 
failing to perform an adequate fire safety inspection of the store as required by 
state statutes.279 The court held that the State could not raise the public duty 
doctrine as a bar to liability for negligence in actions brought in the court of 
claims.280 A dissent argued that, without the protection of the public duty rule, 
government actors would be vulnerable to liability under statutes that charge 
agencies of the state with public or general protective duties.281 
3. 2003 
The Tennessee intermediate appellate court, in Rains v. Bend of the River,282 
reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss brought by a defendant 
who sold ammunition to an underage buyer.283 The decedent's parents sued the 
seller in a wrongful death action, asserting that the seller was negligent per se in 
selling ammunition to an eighteen-year-old buyer who used the ammunition to 
commit suicide.284 The appellate court reasoned that, despite the seller's 
violation of the statute, the boy's suicide was "an independent, intervening cause 
that insulate[d the seller] from [the] ... negligence per se claim" as a matter of 
law.285 Given the troublesome teenage suicide rate, it seems that the legislature 
. . . 
would have contemplated such suicides by fireatms and would have intended to 
protect minors as well as the general citizenry from the rash use of 
firearms. 286 
276. See id at 1224-25. 
277. 773 N.E.2d 1018 (Ohio 2002). 
278. Id at 1021, 1032. 
279. See id. at 1021. 
280. Id at 1032. 
281. Id. at 1041-43 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
282. 124 S.W.3d 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
283. Id. at 584-85. 
284. ld. at 586. 
285. !d. at 596. 
286. The New York Times Almanac summarizes the pertinent national suicide statistics for 
young people as follows: 
Each year, approximately 30,000 Americans kill themselves about one person every 20 
minutes .. . . 
Suicide is the eleventh-leading cause of death of all Americans but the third-leading 
cause for young people age 10-24. Depression, drug abuse, and a history of impulsive, 
aggressive, or antisocial behavior appear to be associated with suicide in young 
people .... 
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The Washington intermediate appellate court, in Skeie v. Mercer Trucking 
Co., Inc.,2s7 reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of a 
trucking company that was sued by the passen er of a car that "crashed head-on 
injured when "the trailer's load of cement blocks [came loose and] fell onto 
him. "289 The appellate court reasoned that the trucking company's statutory 
failure to properly secure the load pursuant to a state statute constituted evidence 
of negligence because the statute, as interpreted by the court, was intended to 
·"protect[] all who travel on public roads against injury from improperly secured 
loads that fall from vehicles[, and the car p~ssenger] was a member of the class 
of people who travel[led] on public roads~"290 Other courts would have found the 
trucking company's violation of the state safety statute to be negligence per 
se.
291 On remand, the trial court judge in such a case would likely face the 
vexing problem of instructing the jury on comparative negligence between the 
trucking company's statutory failure to properly secure the load; the trucker's 
negligence in causing the head-on collision; and the car driver's negligence in 
causing the head-on collision. 
In a confusing application of negligence per se principles, the Illinois 
intermediate appellate court, in Putman v. Village of Bensenville,292 affirmed in 
part the trial court's grant of a summary judgment to a municipality in a 
negligence suit brought by a £edestrian who was rendered a quadriplegic in a fall 
on a village sidewalk ramp.2 3 The appellate court turgidly reasoned that even if 
the relevant provisions of the Illinois Accessibility Code established a negligence 
per· se standard of care for the village in judging whether the ramp was safe, any 
defect in the ramp was "de minimis.''294 While a de minimis noncompliance with 
a state safety statute arguably fits into the Restatement's "further excuses worthy 
of recognition" verbiage,295 the court failed to explain adequately the basis and 
application of its de minimis noncompliance rationale. 
• • • • 
The majority of Americans [in all age groups] who commit suicide shoot themselves 
(55 p~rcent in 1999). 
THE N.Y. TIMES, THE NEW YORK TIMES 2007 ALMANAC 385 (John W~ Wright ed., 2007). 
287. 61 P.3d 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
288. Id at 1208. 
289. Id 
290. ld at 1209. 
291. See, e.g~, Fortner v. Tecchio Trucking, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757-58 (E.D. Tenn. 
2009) (granting partial summary judgment to an injured accident victim on a negligence per se 
claim where the defendant trucking company violated regulations requiring that trucks be loaded 
securely). 
292. 786 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
293. !d. at 204-05. 
294. Id at 208. 
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 15 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
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In a perplexin decision by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Cook v. 
liability enactment, noting that its reading was "similar but not identical to the" 
trial court's view that the state's violation constituted negligence per se?97 The 
Indiana intermediate court had offered yet a third take on the meaning of the dog 
bite statute: the statute did not render the owner liable for negligence per se and 
ordinary rules of common law negligence applied.298 The Cook case is 
illustrative of the wide-ranging and misguided discretion that judges enjoy in 
divining the intent of the legislature's promulgation of a criminal enactment that 
is nonprescriptive in its applicability to a tort action.299 
In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,300 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
liberally interpreted a Baltimore city housing code as creating negligence per se 
liability for a city landlord in an action by a tenant who sued in negligence based 
on the landlord's violation of lead-based paint prohibitions.301 The tenant's child 
had been diagnosed with an elevated blood lead level, and evidence existed that 
the child had consumed paint flakes and chips at the rented apartment.302 The 
litigation created a panoply of different judicial reactions to the local housing 
code: the trial court ·entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff 
dama .es; the intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded for a new 
constructive, the landlord ha[ d] no duty" to remove lead paint prohibited by the 
city housing code.304 
In the Alaska case of Getchell v. Lodge,305 the driver of a car braked to avoid 
a moose and skidded on ice into ohcomin~ .traffic, violating traffic regulations 
that required vehicles to stay on the right.3 6 The plaintiff brought a negli~ence 
action to recover for personal injuries caused by the skidding defendant. 07 At 
trial, the court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the defendant and denied 
plaintiffs motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial 
predicated on a negligence per se argument.308 The Supreme Court of Alaska 
affirmed, holding that reasonable jurors could have concluded that the defendant 
was excused from complying with the pertinent traffic regulations because the 
296. 796 N.E.2d 271 (Ind. 2003). 
297. !d. at 276. 
298. Id. at 274. 
299. See UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.02, at 84-86. 
300. 835 A.2d 616 (Md. 2003). 
301. Id at 618, 627. 
302. Id at 617. 
303. Id at 618. 
304. Id at 632 (Raker, J., dissenting). 
305. 65 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003). 
306. Id at 52-53. 
307. !d. at 52. 
308. !d. at 52-53. 
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presence of a moose in the road created an emergency.309 While the result 
appears to make pragmatic sense, it would seem that Alaska drivers should 
foresee the possibility of moose intruding on their highways~ A fairer allocation 
of the loss. would have been a recovery for the innocent plaintiffs injuries, bas.ed 
on the clear-cut violation of the traffic regulations, reduced by a certain amount 
for the ostensible emergency scenario. Arguably, the presence of a negligence 
per se situation confused the jury and led them to make an either/or decision on 
liability. . 
In Murphy v. State,310 ambiguities in the Washington State Health Care 
Disclosure Act led to a divergence of interpretation between the trial court judge 
and the Washington intermediate appellate court.311 Murphy involved a county 
sheriff and his family who "sued the State for damages . . . caused by the . . . 
[s]tate [pharmacy [b]oard's negligent disclosure of [the sheriffs] prescription 
who used the records in an unsuccessful criminal case against the plaintiff for 
obtaining prescription drugs by deceit.313 The trial court entered judgment on the 
jury verdict for the plaintiffs,. holding that the state pharmacy board had a 
statutory duty to prevent disclosure of private health information.314 The 
intermediate appellate court, however, reversed in part and remanded, holding 
that the trial court had erred in construing the Health Care Disclosure Act as 
creating negligence per se liability.315 Conceding that the legislature had 
intended to "protect patient information from disclosure to the public,'' the 
intermediate appellate court noted that the legislature also intended ''to allow law 
enforcement access [to] enforc[e] prescription drug laws."316 
4. 2004 
The vagaries of a state criminal vegetation maintenance statute figured into 
Judicial confusion in the federal diversity case, Shanklin v. Norfolk Southern 
Railway Co.317 The widow of a car driver who was killed by a train while 
crossing railroad tracks sued the railroad in a wrongful death action, alleging 
negligence due to inadequate warning devices and deficient removal of 
vegetation around the crossing area.318 The federal district court, after an initial 
309. Id at 55. 
310. 62 P.3d 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
311. See id. at 536--37. 
312. Id at 535. 
313. !d. at 535-36. 
314. ld. at 536-37, 542. 
315. ld. at542. 
316. Id. 
317. 369 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 529 U.S. 344 (2000). 
318. Id at 982. 
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remand, entered judgment on a jury verdict for the widow based on negli · ence 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
jury's consideration of Tennessee's vegetation and passenger safety statute did 
not constitute reversible error?20 The appellate court's concurring opinion 
argued that the state statute was relevant as evidence of negligence by the 
railroad toward other classes of persons not specifically delineated in the 
statute.321 
In a questionably narrow construction of a federal statute, a federal district 
judge in Wallace v. United States322 narrowed the plaintiffs' legal claims 
involving exposure of the occupants of a home, purchased from the federal 
government, to lead-based paint.323 The homebuyer brought suit against the 
federal government, a local housing authority, and a realtor, asserting 
negligence, breach of contract, violations of state law, and negligence per se for 
violations of the federal Residential Lead-Base Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 
1992 (RLPHRA).324 All of the charges were predicated on the failure to warn the 
homebuyer of lead-based paint in the house; which he purchased and 
subsequently leased to his children and their mother.325 Granting a partial 
judgment on the plaintiffs' negligence per se claim with respect to the realtor, the 
court found that while the realtor owed a duty to the homebuyer to disclose the 
possible presence of lead paint, the realtor did not owe that same duty to the 
children or their mother because, as mere tenants of the property, they fell 
outside of the protective orbit of the RLPHRA.326 
The Washington dram shop case, Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc.,327 
.. 
created a multiplicity of confusing judicial constructions of the criminal 
provisions in the Alcoholic Beverages Control Act. An intoxicated driver, who 
had been overserved alcohol by the defendant tavern, caused the accident.328 The 
trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the tavern, and the Washington 
intermediate appellate court affirmed.329 The Supreme Court of Washington, 
however, reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court should have 
instructed the jury on the statutory "'apparently under the influence"' 
standard.330 This. standard derived from the state criminal provisions of the 
319. !d. at982-83. 
320. Id. at 992, 994. 
321. ld. at 994-95 (Rogers, J., concurring). 
322. 335 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.R.I. 2004). 
323. !d. at 254-55. 
324. Id 
325. Id at 255. 
326. !d. at 263--66. 
327. 96 P.3d 386 (Wash. 2004). 
328. Id at 387. 
329. !d. at 389. 
330. !d. at 393. 
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Alcoholic Beverages Control Act and was "the minimum standard of conduct for 
commercial hosts whose aile ed overservice cause[d] a drunk driving accident 
obligate the court to apply the negligence per se statutory standard, which would 
modify an already preexisting duty of alcohol providers,332 the other dissent 
countered that the statutory standard should be applied but that the plaintiff 
motorist failed to establish reversible error or prejudice from the trial court's 
improper jury instructions.333 
In the · erplexing New Mexico case, Spencer v. University of New Mexico 
negligence law effect to be given to a problematic state statute that was 
repealed.335 The estate of a patient, who received a fatal injection of heroin by an 
in-home caregiver, sued the caregiver's employer for negligent hiring and 
retention, alleging that the hospital failed to conduct a criminal back~round 
check required by the state Caregivers Criminal History Screening Act.33 After 
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the New 
Mexico intermediate appellate court held that the statute, under the limited 
circumstances of the case at bar, would not form the basis of a duty to conduct 
the prehire background check on the errant caregiver.337 The court made this 
determination despite the fact that the statute was in force when the caregiver 
was hired.338 It predicated its rationale on the questionable subsequent legislative 
intent of a later state legislature, 339 which had decided to repeal the old statute. 340 
A Supreme Court of Connecticut case, Ward v. Greene,341 created splintered 
appellate opinions with differing interpretations of a state statute requiring 
reports of child abuse. The mother, individually and as administratrix of her 
deceased child's estate, sued a private child-placement provider for negligence 
per se in failing to notify a state agency of its suspicions that a dayca:re 
. . . 
employee, who allegedly shook the child to death, had previously abused several 
foster children.342 The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment based 
331. Id 
332. ld. at 400 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
333. ld at 405 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
334. 91 P.3d 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004), rev 'd sub nom. Spencer v. Health Force, Inc., 107 P.3d 
504 (N.M. 2005). 
335. ld. at 76-77. 
336. ld. at 75-76. 
337. Id. at 75, 77. 
338. ld at 77. 
339. Subsequent legislative history coming after a statute is passed by a legislature "is 
highly disfavored for both rule of law and policy reasons." Wn..LIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIPP. 
FRICKEY & ELIZABE1H GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 316 (2d ed. 
2006). 
340. See Spencer, 91 P.3d at 77-78. 
341. 839 A.2d 1259 (Conn. 2004). 
342. Id. at 1262, 1265-66. 
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on the inapplicability of the state reporting statute.343 The Supreme Court of 
Connecticut affirmed, reasoning that the defendant's duty to report suspected 
child abuse under the statute was not mandated for the protection of th-e deceased 
child, who was not within the class of persons to whom the defendant owed a 
duty.344 A dissent, however, argued that the defendant's failure to report 
allegations of abuse violated the statutory duty to all children in the care of the 
suspected abuser. 345 
5. 2005 
A Supreme Court_ of Wyoming case, Landsiedel v. Buffalo Properties, 
LLC/46 illustrates the chaotic effect of building codes that are subject to 
discretionary local adoption. The plaintiff, who was injured when he put his arm 
through a plate glass window as he was leaving a bar, sued the bar owner, 
alleging that it negligently failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe 
condition.347 The trial court entered a judgment on the jury verdict for the bar 
owner.
348 The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed, holding that evidence 
supported the verdict and that the trial court had not erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury on the negligence per se effect of building codes because there was 
conflicting evidence on the issue of whether the building codes, had been 
adopted locally.349 
The Arizona intermediate appellate court, in Martin v. Schroeder, 350 
a~firmed ~he trial court's rulin~ in favor of parents the .defen?ants who had 
gtven thetr adult son a gun.3 1 The appellate court's dtscusston can best be 
understood as an equitable limit on the admittedly applicable negligence per se 
standard imposed by a federal statute. Nine months after the parents gave a gun 
to their adult son, the son accidentally shot his friend in the head while they were 
smoking marijuana together.352 The victim sued the shooter's parents for 
negligent entrustment and negligence per se for violation of the Federal Gun 
Control Act.353 Affirming the trial court's grant of a summary judgment for the 
parents, th-e Arizona interme-diate appellate court agree-d that while the federal 
statute supported a claim of negligence per se because its purpose was to 
protect a class of persons who could be harmed by an unlawful drug user or 
343. !d. at 1264. 
344. Id at 1272-73. 
345. Id at 1273-74 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
346. 112 P.3d 610 (Wyo. 2005). 
347. Id at 612. 
348. !d. 
349. ld. at 617-18. 
350. 105 P.3d 577 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
351. ld. at 578. 
352. I d. at 579. 
353. See id at 579, 582 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006)). 
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addict with a gun the victim's negligence per se claim failed, nevertheless, 
because the plaintiff did not prove that, when the parents gave the son a gun, 
"they knew or had reason to believe he was addicted to marijuana within the 
meaning of the Act.''354 A more convincing rationale for the result, however, 
would be a lack of factual causation or proximate causation connecting the 
parents' inadvertent violation of the statute and the victim's gunshot damages. 
The Idaho case of 0 'Guin v. Bingham County355 involved the reversal by the 
. . . 
Supreme Court of Idaho of the trial court's grant of summary judgment for a 
defendant county that owned a landfill where trespassing children were killed.356 
The Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the· grant of summary judgment and 
remanded for trial the parents' wrongful death action based on the county's 
negligence per se in violating landfill operating regulations.357 The supreme 
·court held that the regulations violation constituted negligence per se and that the 
common law willful-or~wanton standard of care for premises liability to 
trespassers was inapposite. 358 
In a Wyoming negligence per se case, Burnett v. Imerys Marble, Inc.,359 the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming rendered a doctrinally defensible analysis of the 
inapplicability of the Mine Safety and Health Administration MSHA) 
case, a trucking company employee fell off his truck as he was placing tarps over 
a marble load he had picked up at a mine.361 The supreme court reasoned that 
because the statute's purpose was to protect miners working in mines, a 
commercial truck driver like the plaintiff, who occasionally transported products 
produced in the mine, was not exposed to the types of mining hazards 
contemplated in the legislation and, therefore, was not protected by the MSHA 
or its regulations.362 However, a more pragmatic use of the mining statute and its 
regulations might have been for the court to apply them to the injured trucker 
given the special dangers posed by anyone who performs work for a mine.363 
354. ld. at 582-84. 
355. 122 P.3d 308 (Idaho 2005). 
356. ld. at 310. 
357. Id. at 314--15. 
358. Id at 314. 
359. 116 P.3d 460 (Wyo. 2005). 
360. See id at 462--64. 
361. Id at 461. 
362. I d. at 463-64. 
363. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CAREER GUIDE TO 
INDUSTRIES: MINING, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/oco/cg/cgs004.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 
2009) (discussing the dangerous work environments of various mines, quarries, and well sites for 
miners, loading-machine operators, and truck drivers working therein); see also Mike Waterhouse, 
Coal Truck Driver Killed at WV Mine, WSAZ, Aug~ 23, 2008, http://www.wsaz.com/news/ 
headlines/27313294.html (reporting the death of a truck driver from an accident on his "second day 
working at a mine"). 
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6. 2006 
A multiple tractor-trailer accident involving violations of safety regulations 
pertaining to commercial vehicle wheels created discomfiture for a Texas trial 
court in Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres.364 The trial court entered judgment 
on a jury verdict awarding damages to a driver injured in the wreck. 365 The court 
provided a negligence per se jury instruction predicated on a commercial vehicle 
safety regulation violated when two wheels separated from a trucking rig.366 The 
Texas intermedia!e apFellate court ~eversed. in part and ~emanded for. a n~w ~~al 
on the cross-clatms.3 7 It based tts holdtng on the tmproper strtct habthty 
standard articulated by the trial court's negligence per sejury instructions.368 The 
problem could have been avoided, according to the appellate court, by the trial 
-court's submission of an "excuse instruction ... permit[ting] the jury to consider 
whether [the defendant trucking firm] knew or should have known" of safety 
problems with the wheels.369 · 
In White v. Sabatino,370 a federal district court judge in Hawaii faced an 
unusual admiralty-based argument of a cruise ship owner in a suit by the 
. . 
administrator of the estate of a motorist who was killed in an automobile 
accident with an intoxicated driver who had attended a "snorkeling cruise."371 
The plaintiff claimed that the cruise ship owner's practice of serving "unlimited . 
. . liquor for a fixed price during a set period of time" violated a county's liquor 
ordinance.372 The cruise ship owner unsuccessfully sought a limitation of 
liability based on the vessel's value.373 The court, in tum, granted partial 
summary judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that th·e plaintiff could proceed 
without limitation.374 The trial court concluded that the county liquor ordinance 
established a negligence per se standard for the cruise ship owner and that there 
was a reasonably close causal relation between the breach of the county 
ordinance and the accident because the decedent was the type of victim the 
ordinance was intended to protect from the type of accident the ordinance was 
intended to prevent.375 All in all, this approach to the negligence per se made 
sense. The court was justified in ignoring the hypertechnical admiralty damages 
limitation argument of the cruise ship owner. Furthermore, the court exhibited 
364. 191 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App. 2006). 
365. !d. at :835. 
366. Id at 834, 838-39 (citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 393.205, 396.3, 396.13 (2005)). 
367. Id at 852. 
368. Id. at 841. 
369. Id at 842. 
370. 415 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. Haw. 2006). 
371. ld. at 1167--68. 
372. ld. at 1181. 
373. Id. at 1181, 1186. 
374. Id. at 1186. 
375. Id at 1182-84. 
2009] THE TROUBLE WITH NEGLIGENCE PER SE 271 
sense in accepting the county liquor control ordinance as a practical, specific 
standard of care, notwithstanding the view by some other courts that a county's 
legislative enactment should be viewed as less prestigious than a state or federal 
statute. 3 7 6 
Another practical and sensible judicial negligence per se decision was the 
Arizona intermediate appellate court's reversal, in Gipson v. Kasey,311 of a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant.378 Gipson was a wrongful 
death action by a surviving parent of a drug-overdose victim against the victim's 
co-worker.379 The surviving parent alleged that the coworker negligently caused 
the victim's death by furn~shing prescri~ti?n ~ills to the vi~tim's girl~iend, who 
subsequently gave the pills to the victim. 80 In reversing the trial court's 
summary judgment for the defendant, the appellate court discerned a statute-
based duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the victim.381 The court 
looked to the strong public policy behind several state and federal statutes that 
outlawed distributing prescription drugs to those who had not been prescribed 
the medications.382 The opinion refreshingly departed from the traditional 
negligence per se mechanistic tests, which seek to discern vague and often 
nonexistent ~'legislative intent" to create a tort duty standard from a criminal or 
regulatory enactment.383 Instead, it wisely focused on more realistic and coherent 
public policy considerations. 384 
In a mechanistic and stilted negligence per se ruling, the North Carolina 
intermediate appellate court, in Hall v. Toreros, II, Inc. / 85 shunned polic · 
In Hall, victims of an automobile collision caused by an intoxicated driver 
brought a negligence suit against a restaurant that had served alcoholic beverages 
to a customer who later drove away from the restaurant.387 The trial court 
granted the restaurant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after 
376. See, e.g., Schumer v. Caplin, 150 N.E. 139, 140 (N.Y. 1925) ("The violation of a statute 
under certain circumstances may of itself establish negligence. Not so, however, with a rule or 
ordinance."). 
377. 129 P.3d 957 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006), vacated in part by 150 P.3d 228 (Ariz. 2007). 
378. Id at 959. 
379. !d. at 960. 
380. !d. at 959-60. 
381. Id. at 962-63. 
382. ld. 
383. See Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]he 
touchstone . . . is the presence of an expression of legislative intent specifically to create such a 
right, and the form and language of the rule are the primary indicators of such an expression." 
(alteration in original) (quoting Kranzusb v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 268 
(Wis. 1981))). 
384. Gipson, 129 P.3d at 963. 
385. 626 S.E.2d 861 (N.C. Ct. App~ 2006). 
386. See id. at 869. 
387. !d. at 863. 
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the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.388 In affirming, the North Carolina 
intermediate appellate court held that the trial court was correct in rejecting the 
plaintiffs' argument that a state Alcoholic Beverage- Control Commission 
regulation imposed a legal duty on the restaurant to prevent the driver from 
consuming alcohol on its premises after it knew that he was intoxicated.389 The 
appellate court went on to note that the statutory scheme, under which the 
administrative regulation was promulgated, did not contain any express language 
regarding consumption ofalcohol by intoxicated persons.390 · 
IV. FROM READING LEGISLATIVE TEA LEAVES OF INTENT TO ASTUTE JUDICIAL 
. . 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
Negligence per se analysis judicial efforts to interpret the nonprescriptive 
commands of an authoritative legislative body or administrative agency in an 
effort to determine whether a tort jury should have its common law role of 
applying a broad standard of reasonable care under the circumstances trumped 
by a more specific standard of care suffers from both general form and 
function problems and specific form and function problems. 
The discussion that follows first considers the general form and function 
problems of judicial negligence per se analysis. Then it reviews a host of specific 
form and function issues of judicial negligence per se analysis.391 
A. An Overview of Negligence Per Se Form and Function Problems 
Negligence per se analysis in American judicial opinions emerged from the 
first mention ofthe phrase "negligence per se" in an 1841 judicial opinion,392 to 
twenty-first century cases applying_ methodologies of legislative intent and 
purpose.393 In terms of legal theory, this negligence per se analysis is a general 
. . 
type of functional legal form involving a methodological type and an interpretive 
subtype, with implications for institutional, preceptual, and enforcement or 
implementive types of legal form.394 Part IV.B first delineates and amplifies 
these general form and function terms, which were previously articulated by 
Professor Robert S. Summers. It describes American judicial negligence per se 
analysis in terms of Summer's form and function typology. Part IV.C and Part 
388. Id. at 864. 
389. Id at 867-70. 
390. !d. at 869. 
391. I am particularly indebted to the excellent theoretical book, ROBERTS. SU1viMERS, FORM 
AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM (2006). 
392. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. 
393. See supra Part III. C. 
394. See infra Part IV.B. 
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IV.D then analyze general and specific legal form and function problems of the 
negligence per se doctrine. 
B. An Introduction to Legal Form and Function Theory 
Summers explained that "[t]he overall forms of functional legal units" in a 
modern legal system "stand as tributes to the organizational inventiveness of 
developed Western societies. The realization of humanistic values, including 
justi~e, order, liberty, de~o~racy, _rationali~, the rule of law, and m?~e, has been 
heavily dependent on this Inventiveness." 95 Yet, somewhat surprisingly, legal 
forms "purposive systematic arrangements" of a legal system "have seldom 
in the course of Western legal theory been explicitly conceived as objects of 
frontal and systematic theoretical inquiry,'' and consequently, this disorderly 
theoretical tendency has impeded the full "understanding of the nature of 
functional legal units or as contributing to the efficacy of such units as means to 
ends."396 
Summers noted that "purported 'law' may be so deficient in form as to be 
profoundly dysfunctional, and thus be at best a highly degenerate specimen of 
law, and, if deficient enough, not law at all, even though officially 'laid 
down.'"397 He explained that "[r]eason should permeate and shape the purposive 
design of overall form, its constituent features, and the complementa material 
duly designed forms, even the fotentially most proficient of such components 
could avail us relatively little. "39 
Summers set forth five general types of "overall forms of functional legal 
units."40° First, "a functional legal unit may be institutional in nature."401 
Institutional types include legislatures, courts, administrative bodies, and 
corporate and other private entities.402 Second, "a functional legal unit may 
be ... preceptua/."403 Preceptual types include rules, principles, maxims, and 
general orders.404 Third, "a functional legal unit may be ... methodologica/."405 
395. Sillv1MERS, supra note 391, at 7. 
396. !d. 
397. Id. at 34. "For example, the expressional feature of the overall form of an enacted 
statutory rule otherwise in due form may be such that what the rule means is quite unclear to all of 
its addressees! [In Professor Summers's] view, such a 'rule' would fail to qualify as law at all." Id. 
398. Id at 35. 
399. Id 
400. Id at 54. 
401. Id at 37 (emphasis added). 
402. Id. at 54. 
403. Id at 37 (emphasis added). 
404. !d. at 54. 
405. !d. at 37 (emphasis added). 
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Methodological types include interpretation, drafting, and fact-finding.406 Fourth, 
"a functional legal unit may be ... enforcive."407 Enforcive legal units include 
sanctions, remedies, and others.408 Finally, "a functional legal unit may be ... a 
nonpreceptual species of law."409 Nonpreceptual types include contracts, 
property interests, and wills.410 However, the schematic by Summers is not 
xh . . 411 e austtve. 
Summers went on to explain that "[t]he ... forms of functional legal units 
within Western legal systems vary in their approximations to what may be ideal. 
Yet these forms define and organize the [legal] units to serve purposes."412 
Indeed, he noted that "[w]hen the purposes to be served are valuable, and these 
forms and their complementary material ... are sufficiently well-designed, then 
some value will ordinarily be realized when the units are duly put to use."413 
Finally, with regard to the interpretive subtype of the methodological type of 
overall forms of functional legal units what may be viewed as the key 
functional legal unit in negligence per se analysis "[t]he purposes ofthe overall 
form ... of a methodology for interpreting statutes include objective, reasoned, 
faithful, consistent, predictable, efficient, and purpose-fulfilling 
interpretation."414 Moreover, ''[i]t is also a systematic means to the realization of 
more ultimate purposes such as democracy, legitimacy, and the rule of law."415 
Judges and lawyers must understand "[t]he primary criterion of interpretive 
faithfulness" in fashioning arguments for statutory interpretation.416 Professor 
Summers has identified at least five candidates as the primary criterion of 
statutory faithfulness: 
(1) [T]he interpretation that confonns most closely to the relevant 
standard ordinary, or relevant standard technical, or relevant special, 
meaning of the language adopted in the statute, in light of immediate 
purposes of the statute evident from text and context (language-
oriented), or 
(2) the interpretation that best accords with reliable evidence of the 
applicational intentions of individual legislators, or of major committees 
406. !d. at 54. 
407. Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 
408. ld. at 54. 
409. ld. at 37 (emphasis added). 
410. Id at 54. 
411. Id For example, the jury would be another illustrative institutional type of functional 
legal unit. 
412. Id at 38. 
413. Id. 
414. Id at 242. 
415. !d. 
416. !d. at 255. 
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of legislators, or of sponsoring legislators speaking on the floor of the 
legislature, etc. (intent-oriented), or 
. . (3) the interpretation that best implements the ultjmate general purpose 
or purposes justifiably attributable to the legislature in adopting the 
statute, (ultimate purpose-oriented), or 
( 4) the interpretation that best implements a policy judges themselves 
wish to implement, believe the legislature may have espoused, and 
believe to be achievable in the circumstances, (policy-oriented), or 
(5) some other criterion.417 
275 
C. General Form and Function Problems of the Negligence Per Se 
Doctrine 
There are six overarching general form and function problems with 
traditional negligence per se analysis. 
First, as a major, functional legal unit involving an interpretational 
methodology for judges to decide whether a nonprescriptive statutory or 
administrative standard should constitute, as a matter of law, a specific standard 
of conduct in a tort action (typically of negligence), the methodology, while 
inventive and motivated by the democratic ~'rule of law" values to apply criminal 
and administrative standards of care implicitly sanctioned by a legislative body 
or agency, is seriously flawed by what may be termed a fundamental origin 
problem. As demonstrated in the initial portions of this Article, nineteenth 
century American judges started to utilize negligence per se parlance as a 
shorthand way of describing certain types of conduct as negligent as a matter of 
law.418 This approach was closely related to so-called rule of law assessments 
made by judges in an "attempt to create specific rules of conduct that 
they ... declare to be the rule the reasonable person will always follow."419 This 
disorqerly genesis confused negligence per se analysis as it later developed that 
is, when courts began creating tort actions from nonprescriptive legislative 
417. Id. (emphasis added). Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett espouse a "pragmatic theory" of 
statutory interpretation, which consists of a "web of beliefs" that views "human decisionmaking'.' as 
"polycentric, spiral, and inductive, not unidimensional, linear, and deductive," and assert that under 
this approach, ''the most concrete considerations," like "statutory text" and "specific legislative 
intent," outweigh more abstract ones, like "imaginative reconstruction," "legislative purpose," 
"evolution of [the] statute," and "current values." ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 339, 
at 249-50. Their model suggests an interactive process of statutory interpretation that considers 
these factors, "considering the strengths of various considerations, rethinking each in light of the 
others, and weighing ~em against one another" in the process of interpretation. Id at 250. 
418. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text. 
419. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 132, at 309. 
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criminal or administrative rules. 420 This has left dangling, so to speak, vital 
issues of means and ends instead of fashioning a theoretically sound purposive, 
systematic arrangement in tort law. 
Second, negligence per se analysis as an interpretational methodology was 
not duly and purposively designed, and therefore, it suffers an unreasoned 
haphazardness problem. Indeed, negligence per se analysis "grew up without 
careful explicit consideration" of ends and means and "[c]ommentators dreamed 
up [various] fanciful explanations for the" methodology and rule of liability for 
breaching a nonprescriptive legislative or administrative standard.421 "One 
argument was that the legislature intended to provide for tort liabili£' but forgot 
to do so. Another was that reasonable people always obey statutes."42 
Third, negligence per se analysis, similar to the methodology of judge-made 
rules of law in negligence cases, is often rigid and overinclusive, forbidding or 
limiting the jury's "assessment of the evidence to determine whether [a civil 
litigant] was negligent in the particular circumstances" suggested by the 
evidence.423 While specific excuses have been incorporated into negligence per 
se jurisprudence by various iterations of the American Law Institute's 
Restatement of Torts,424 the analytical gestalt of negligence per se is, 
nevertheless, characterized by a nonjlexibility problem. 
Fourth, negligence per se analysis suffers from an institutional legitimacy 
problem. Courts employing negligence per se principles do not generally claim 
that the pertinent legislature or administrative agency intended to imply a tort 
cause of action.425 Yet courts, concomitantly, are not candid in describing what 
they are doing as judicial creation of tort law standards that restrict the baseline 
freedom and flexibility of a jury to consider the question of reasonableness. 
420. See supra notes 32-126 and accompanying text. A chronic unsystematic American 
approach to ordering and interpreting statutes exacerbates the disorderly genesis of negligence per 
se analysis. See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods 
and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 545 (2006) (noting that three factors coalesce to 
create indeterminate American statutory law: "lack of system in ordering and interpreting statutes; 
assimilation of statutes to common law resulting in the undermining [ ofj the reliability of statutes as 
authoritative rules; and encouragement of lawyers to develop novel legal theories"). 
421. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 319. 
422. ld. 
423. ld. § 132, at 310 (discussing rigidity and overinclusiveness of judge-made rules of law in 
negligence cases like "stop, look, and listen'' railroad crossing cases). 
424. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 288A (1965) (enumerating excuses for 
various situations in which violating a statute is otherwise reasonable); RESTATE:rvtENT OF TORTS 
§ 286 cmt. c (1934) (discussing situations like emergencies where "the circumstances justify an 
apparent disobedience to the letter ofthe enactment"). 
425. See, e.g., White v. Sabatino, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1182-84 (D. Haw~ 2006) (relying on 
its O\Vll conclusion that the victim was the type of victim the ordinance was intended to protect and 
that the accident was the type of accident the ordinance was intended to prevent). 
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Fifth, the effect of a negligence per se ruling in a case creates confusion and 
complexity for a trial court and a jury resulting in a dysfunctional preceptual 
problem~ 
Finally, negligence per se can lead to disproportionate liability for litigants 
who breach nonprescriptive criminal-based statutory or administrative rules.426 
This is best described as a dysfunctional enforcement or implementive problem. 
FIGURE 1 
Summary of General Form and 
Function Problems with Negligence Per Se 
Problem 
1 ~ Fundamental Origin 
2. Unreasoned Haphazardness 
3. Nonflexibility 
Nature ofProblem 
• The historical basis of the 
doctrine is hard to trace. 
,• The judiciary did not duly and 
purposively design the 
doctrine. 
• There is a lack of an adequate 
means and ends analysis. 
• The judicial explanations for 
the doctrine are dubious. 
• The doctrine's rigid and 
overinclusive approach is 
similar to "rule of law" 
negligence. 
,• The doctrine restricts the 
jury's full, contextualized 
assessment of all the evidence 
bearing on facts of negligent 
conduct. 
426. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90. 
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4. Institutional Legitimacy 
5. Dysfunctional Preceptual 
6. Dysfunctional Enforcement or 
Implementive 
• There is a lack of judicial 
candor regarding judicial 
creation of tort law standards 
while restricting jury's role. 
• Some courts errantly claim 
that they are bound by 
legislative intent in the face of 
a textually nonprescriptive 
criminal or administrative 
enactment that says nothing 
about tort law. 
• There is excessiv,e confusion 
among trial courts, judges, 
andjuries in understanding 
and applying the doctrine in 
concrete cases. 
• Disproportionate liability 
exists for tort damages. 
D. Specific Form and Function Problems of the Negligence Per Se 
Doctrine 
On a more detailed level, there are numerous specific form and function 
problems with the negligence per se doctrine. 
First, "[t]hough well-settled [for over a century], there is certainly room to 
question the propriety of placing so much weight on laws that were enacted 
without any indication of an intent to affect negligence law.',427 Moreover, 
statutory text provides absolutely no language-oriented criterion for concrete, 
"objective, reasoned, faithful, consistent, predictable, efficient, and purpose-
fulfilling [judicial] interpretation''428 of nonprescriptive statutes and 
administrative regulations. By virtue of the negligence per se doctrine, relatively 
abstract considerations of legislative purpose ungrounded, by definition, in 
either concrete statutory text or concrete specific legislative intent are 
ritualistically invoked by judges in a highly manipulable process that leads to 
divergent and unpredictable results. 
Second, an important specific "criticism arises from the widely divergent 
impact the violation of a criminal statute has in a criminal prosecution from that 
in a tort case."429 One commentator described the problem as follows: 
427. ld. 
428. SIDAI\1ERS, supra note 391, at 242. 
429. UNDERSTANDING TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 202, § 6.07, at 100. 
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Violation of most of the criminal statutes used in negligence per se cases 
leads to the imposition of a modest fine in the criminal context. Because 
of the slight penalty and the enormous administrative burden required 
by considering all possible defenses, these offenses are often strict 
liability in nature, thus disposing of the State's requirement to show a 
bad intent. In the negligence per se context, however, the impact of 
violation can be enormous as the defendant is liable for all the harm 
proximately caused by the statutory violation. Further, this result can be 
achieved without pro;idin~ th~ s?rt of safeSuards (such as an elevated 
burden of proof) provtded t.n crtmtnal cases. 0 
279 
Third, given that most American jurisdictions have come to allow judicial 
consideration of "broad excuses" for statutory and administrative violations of a 
nonprescriptive enacted standard in the context of tort cases,431 it is highly 
questionable why courts allow precious judicial resources to be consumed in a 
remarkably inefficient process of considering potential nonprescriptive standards 
and far ranging, unlimited excuses.432 
Fourth, the very conceptual foundation of the rationale for the negligence 
per se doctrine "the doctrine's ability to provide greater certainty than the usual 
reasonable person standard" is undermined by the broad and far ranging 
excuses that may be considered as reasons for why a tort litigant violated a 
particular nonprescriptive standard.433 · 
Fifth, ''the negligence per se doctrine greatly constricts the jury's traditional 
role of determining breach [of a duty of care] and often invests the trial judge 
with broad discretion. To the extent that judge-made [rule of law] standards of 
care have been rejected," it is anomalous for judges to have "wide discretion to 
impose legislative standards" under negligence per se principles.434 
Sixth, the doctrine of negligence per se constitutes an inappropriate, and 
arguably radical, "encroachment upon the . . . legislature" and duly constituted 
430. ld. at 100-01 (emphasis omitted). 
431. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90 n.18. 
432. Perhaps a key motivation for the attraction of negligence per se analysis is the elusive 
desire of judges to control their busy dockets and to simplify the resolution of disputes. In this 
regard, see LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 148-52 (1930). Green viewed the then-nascent 
negligence per se doctrine in American tort cases as a simplifying judicial device akin to the way 
that courts had attempted to simplify judicial resolution of cases involving damages from wild 
animals, abnormally dangerous activities, slander per se rules, and libel per se rules.ld at 148-50. 
Yet, Green recognized the efficacy problem of negligence per se escape hatches (like contributory 
negligence and proximate causation) that made negligence per se analysis inefficient and time 
consuming.Jd at 150. 
433. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90 n.l8. 
434. ld at 90 (emphasis omitted); cf. GREEN, supra note 432, at 166 e'Nothing is more 
obvious from a reading of the cases than that courts desire to pass the negligence issue to the jury as 
free from any commitments as possible and yet subjecting the jury to as much control as possible."). 
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administrative agencies that have been delegated power to administratively 
govern social problems. 435 "If the legislature elects to do so, it surely may 
impose civil liability'' expressly by statutory enactment.436 "When it does not 
. . 
.elect to do so," it is hubristic and intrusive for a court to "presume'' a legislative 
purpose based on abstract and undisciplined "readings'' of eneralized 
FIGURE2 
Summary of Specific Form and 
Function Problems with Negligence Per Se 
Problem 
1. Highly Manipulable • 
Nature of Problem 
Courts can pick and choose 
assorted vague and 
unpersuasive indicia of 
legislative intent 
notwithstanding. 
nonprescriptive text and 
nonexistent legislative historv. 
2. Import of Criminal Law Standards • 
Without Criminal Law Protections for 
Defendants 
Tort defendants are held 
accountable for proximately 
caused civil damages without 
plaintiffs bearing heightened 
burden of proof requirements 
when using a quasi-criminal 
or administrative enactment. 
3. Uncabined Excuses 
4. Self-Defeating 
5. Excessive Judicial Discretion 
• The doctrine creates confusion 
and inefficiencies for trial 
. . . 
courts and juries with high 
administrative costs. 
• The potentially numerous and 
hard to apply excuses 
undermine the so-called 
greater certainty of the 
doctrine. 
• The doctrine displaces the 
·ury's traditional role in 
435. UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90. 
436. ld. 
437. ld. 
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assessing fault in tort cases 
with "udicial officiousness. 
6. Judicial Encroachment on Legislature • It is hubristic and intrusive for 
the judiciary to presume a 
legislative purpose based on 
abstract and undisciplined 
readings of legislative intent 
regarding a nonprescriptive 
enactment. 
E. Toward a Systematic Negligence Per Se Approach Involving Astute 
Judicial Policy Analysis 
A magical, one-size-fits-all approach will not resolve the trouble with 
negligence per se. However, American courts could improve the judicial 
decision "for determining when to adopt and when to reject a nonprescriptive 
statute"438 or administrative regulation by following a few basic principles. 
First and foremost, courts of last resort should candidly urge legislatures and 
administrative agencies to set forth, in the enacted text of a police regulation, 
whether the enactment should be used in tort actions and whether the enacted 
standard (if expressly applicable to tort) is subject to any excuses for compliance 
and the specific substance of those excuses. In this regard, legislatures and 
administrative bodies (and their counsel) should strive to upgrade the craft of 
drafting statutes and regulations so that uniform and consistent language is 
routinely inserted into new police enactments on the prescriptiveness or 
nonapplicability of the enactment in tort actions. A text-based approach to 
modifying (or not modifying) the baseline common law standard of the 
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances would obviate many of the 
deficiencies of intent-based negligence per se analysis. As pointed out by Wilson 
Huhn, "areas of common law are shrinking relative to text-bound law. As society 
becomes more complex, legislatures have enacted detailed statutes_ and 
comprehensive c~?es to bring uniformity and consistency to areas formerly 
governed by dectstonal law."4 9 And yet, we cannot expect a better and more 
systematic legislative process to solve the negligence per se conundrum in every, 
or perhaps in most, situations. "Rather, the legislative process is an often-chaotic 
process of lobbying by interest groups and of assessments by legislators of the 
public interest and of their own, sometimes less public-regarding needs (such as 
438. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 135, at 32L I attempt to address the challenge set forth by 
Professor Dobbs to advance "systematic principles" in this vexing area. See id. 
439. WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 18 (2002). 
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reelection)."440 An extreme view of the disorderliness of the legislative process is 
that it consists of "merely the operation of politics conducted in an environment 
virtually bereft of principled behavior."441 But, legislators are capable of taking 
their lawmaking functions seriously442 and crafting the words that they enact into 
textual public commands in a careful manner.443 
Second, in the absence of a clear-cut prescriptive legislative or 
administrative rule establishing a srecific standard of care in a tort suit, courts 
should prefer the tradition-baser! . 4 and precedent-basecf45 ordinary prudent 
person under the circumstances standard as discerned and applied by a common 
law jury (with the possibility that a violation of a nonprescriptive enactment 
could be considered by the jury as evidence of negligence). The venerable 
reasonably prudent person standard has stood the test of time for nearly two 
centuries of the Anglo-American experience.446 Moreover, courts of last resort 
440. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 339, at 3. 
441. !d. 
442. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process 
Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REV. 895, 897-927 (2005) (outlining theoretical 
attributes of a good American legislator). 
443. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Legislation, Authority, and Voting, 84 GEO. L.J. 2185, 
2204--06 (1996) (emphasizing the difficulty of legislative decision making to justify the respect that 
the legislature deserves); Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REv. 633, 653-54 
(1995) (arguing that careful attention to statutory text by legislators should be required by the very 
nature of a legislative body as "a large gathering of disparate individuals who purport to act 
collectively in the name of the whole community, but who can never be sure exactly what it is that 
they have settled on, as a collective body, except by reference to a given form of words in front of 
them"). 
444. "Tradition ... exerts a silent influence on legal reasoning. Our traditions establish 
'baselines,' which are background assumptions that favor the status quo and place the burden of 
proof on any person who seeks to change the existing order." HilliN, supra note 439, at 49. 
445. "The principle of stare decisis (which literally means 'to stand by things decided') is 
what lends strength to precedent. Stare decisis encourages courts to follow their own prior 
decisions, and it requires lower courts to follow decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction." 
ld at 42 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999)). 
446. See generally DOBBS, supra note 2, §§ 117-118, at 277-81 (describing the objective 
reasonable person standard). The objective reasonable person standard goes back at least to 
Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (C.P.). This proposal for using the objective 
reasonable prudent standard as a baseline in the face of nonprescriptive statutory and administrative 
police commands would not affect other areas of negligence law where "[t]he default standard of 
reasonable care yields to the law's lesser standard for children, for instance, and in medical 
malpractice cases the standard yields to the standard implicity undertaken by the physician and 
based upon the custom of the medical community" or, by way of another traditional example, where 
courts "may requjre of landowners very little care toward [adult] trespassers." DOBBS, supra note 2, 
§ 117, at 277; see also Bauman v. Crawford, 704 P.2d 1181, 1187-89 (Wash. 1985) (Brachtenbach, 
J ., concurring) (urging the reexamination of "the entire theory of negligence per se arising from the 
alleged violation of a statute, an ordinance or an administrative regulation''). In Bauman, the 
concurrence pointed out several practical problems with the doctrine of negligence per se and urged, 
in the State of Washington, "prospectively limit[ing] the doctrine to an evidence of negligence 
standard'' because, among other problems~ the negligence per se doctrine "removes the 
2009] THE TROUBLE WITH NEGLIGENCE PER SE 283 
could provide proper separation of powers incentives to legislatures and 
administrative agencies in their respective jurisdictions by announcing a clear 
statement rule of interpretation that legislative bodies, including local bodies and 
administrative agencies, under the jurisdiction of the court of last resort, may 
create specific negligence per se standards of care in tort cases only by making 
their intention unmistakably clear in the textual language of the standard, 
ordinance, or administrative regulation.447 
Third, courts of last resort should reserve the judicial power to borrow 
selectively and rarely nonprescriptive statutory and administrative standards to 
modify the default objective reasonable person standard in civil tort suits. 
However, the basis for this borrowing should not be intent-basecf48 arguments, 
which are usually inefficacious in negligence per se jurisprudence, but on astute 
policy analysis.449 Furthermore, judicial policy-based borrowing in this regard 
should be extraordinarily rigorous and based on well briefed policy analyses by 
counsel. Unless compelling legislative facts brought to a court's attention or 
subject to judicial notice provide a strong factual prediction that borrowing a 
nonprescriptive legislative or administrative standard will, on balance; 
substantially improve the use of the objective ordinary prudent person standard, 
courts of last resort should refuse to borrow the nonprescriptive standards. 
determination of negligence from the fact-fmding function of the jury, or the [trial] court sitting as a 
fact fmder.'' Bauman, 704 P.2d at 1187-89 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring). 
447. Clear statement rules of statutory interpretation have been employed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States for the purpose of protecting federalism issues under the U.S. 
Constitution. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 339, at 367-75. By analogy, a clear 
statement rule for a legislative or administrative creation of a specific tort standard of care would 
protect institutional prerogatives of the judiciary and the jury to adjudicate tort suits using the 
traditional negligence standard absent a clear indication from the legislature or executive branches 
of government, within their constitutional powers, to alter those traditional prerogatives. See 
UNDERSTANDING TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 222, § 6.07, at 90. 
448. Intent-based arguments in law are based on numerous materials that are often vague and 
abstract. Statutory and administrative intent is often divined by textual hints, previous versions of 
the text, specific sequences of events leading up to an enactment, reports of legislative committees, 
other government reports, and other miscellaneous commentaries. See HUHN, supra note 439, at 31-
43. 
449. Professor Huhn explains: 
There is a fundamental difference between policy arguments and the other four 
types of legal argument. The distinctive feature of policy arguments is that they are 
consequentialist in nature. The other four types of argument are appeals to authority, but 
the core of a policy argument is that a certain interpretation of the law will bring about a 
certain state of affairs, and this state of affairs is either acceptable or unacceptable in the 
eyes of the law. Deriving rules of law from text, intent, precedent and tradition is 
inherently conventional; such rules represent specific choices that our lawgivers have 
already made. Deriving rules from policy arguments, on the other hand, is inherently 
open-ended; the specific choice has not yet been made. Text, intent, precedent and 
tradition look principally to the past for guidance; policy arguments look to the future for 
confmnation. 
Jd. at 51. 
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Possible judicial policy considerations in making this determination might 
include the following: (1) "the limits to implementation, administration, and 
control"450 that counsel in favor of modest and restrained judicial 
experimentation in tinkering with the basic negligence standard, which would 
allow the jury to consider nonprescriptive statutory and regulatory violations and 
justifications for those violations; (2) the likely consequences451 of borrowing a 
nonprescriptive statutory or administrative standard to the proper functioning of 
a civil tort system involving lay juries and busy generalist trial court judges; (3) 
the prospects of the legislature's seasonably amending a nonprescriptive statute 
to encompass a prescriptive tort standard in future cases after judicial 
hi~h~ighting of the nonp~es~riptive police standard in ~he ~ourse of ~n aFEellate 
optnton and communtcattng the matter to legtslattve offictals; 2 (4) 
"benchmarking" the prevalence of specific safety standards in particular areas of 
tort law for example, industrial electrical wiring and grounding, operation of 
heavy trucks, and commercial building construction;453 (5) the judicial opinions 
of trial court judges and intermediate appellate court judges on the advisability of 
a baseline reasonable person standard versus more specific standards of care in 
certain kinds of tort suits where those specific standards are ensconced in 
nonprescriptive policy or regulatory enactments;454 and (6) economic analyses 
such as cost-benefit review, which is "the most straightforward attempt to 
450. Robert E. Goodin et al., The Public and Its Policies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 3, 4 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter PuBLIC POLICY] (citing 
CHRISTOPHER C. HOOD, THE LIMITS OF ADl'viiNISTRATION (1976); JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & 
AARON WILDAVSKY, lNIPLEMENTATION (1973); HERMAN R. VAN GUNSTEREN, THE QUEST FOR 
CONTROL (1976)). 
. . 
451. See generally id. at 6 ("Policy studies embody a bias toward acts, outputs, and 
outcomes a concern with consequences that contrasts with the formal-institutional orientation of 
much of the rest of political studies.''). 
452. Cf id at 11-12 (discussing "networked governance" and asserting that "[b ]road 
cooperation from a great many effectively independent actors is required in order for any of them to 
accomplish their goals''). 
453. Cj id at 19 ("In the first instance, there is merely a process of collecting information on 
policy performance ... on some systematic, comparable basis. But once that has been done, the 
performance of better-performing states will almost automatically come to serve as a 'benchmark' 
for the others to aspire to voluntarily initially, but with increasing amounts of informal and fonn.al 
pressure as time goes by." (citing TONY ATKINSON ET AL., SOCIAL INDICATORS: THE EU AND 
SOCIAL INCLUSION (2002); Claus Offe, The European Model of "Social" Capitalism: Can It 
Survive European Integration?, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 437 (2003))). 
454. Cj Richard Freeman, Learning in Public Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 450, at 
367-88 (discussing the improvement of public policy decision making overtime through the process 
of thinking about and resolving public policy problems); Goodin et al., supra note 450, at 19 
("Policy, like all human action, is undertaken partly in ignorance; and to a large extent is a matter of 
'learning-by-doing.''' (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 
29 REv. ECON. STUD. 155, 155 (1962); Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War, and Decision: Why 
Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable, 31 WORLD POL. 61, 61-62 (1978))). 
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measure the economic efficiency of policy altematives"455 and which would 
entail continuing with the general tort default standard of reasonable care under 
the circumstances or borrowing more specific nonprescriptive statutory and 
administrative standards for specific kinds of tort cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Negligence per se analysis is built on weak foundations. In the early 
nineteenth century, courts started to use "negligence per se" parlance to talk 
about conduct that was, or should be, negligent as a matter of law. As the 
nineteenth century ripened and ultimately transitioned to the twentieth century, 
courts and commentators parroted various unexamined assumptions for why a 
nonprescriptive policy or regulatory standard should or should not be utilized in 
a tort action. Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the Court Appeals for New York in a 
famous 1920 opinion, proclaimed, with Platonic certitude, that the unexcused 
violation of a nonprescriptive statutory enactment was negligence per se,456 an 
essentialist judicial approach that contradicted an influential treatise that he 
published in 1921 about the theory of judging. American courts have expended 
considerable time and effort along with the time and effort of countless 
lawyers and jurors in trying to conceptualize, analyze, understand, and apply 
cumbersome and unwieldy negligence per se doctrine. In large measure, the 
negligence per se doctrine has created a cottage judicial industry of reading 
legislative tea leaves. This is a misconceived enterprise to discern legislative 
intent to allow, or disallow, a nonprescriptive statutory standard that fails to 
. . 
specify in the text of the enactment that it governs tort suits to be used in place 
of, or along with, the traditional ordinary prudent person standard of care under 
the circumstances. 
Negligence per se doctrine suffers from assorted general form and function 
problems which consist of a fundamental origin problem, an unreasoned 
haphazardness problem, a nonflexibility problem, an institutional legitimacy 
problem, a dysfunctional preceptual problem, and a dysfunctional enforcement 
or implementive problem. Moreover, numerous specific form and function 
problems hobble the negligence per se doctrine. One such problem is the 
prevalence of broad and far ranging excuses that serve to vitiate the purpose of 
the doctrine and lead to inefficient uses of judicial and legal resources. Another 
is the unfair impact that can occur in utilizing nonprescriptive, quasi-criminal 
violations that require a violator to pay exorbitant tort damages for all harm 
proximately caused by the statutory violation. 
It is high time for courts of last resort to move away from the problematic 
intent-based approach of the negligence per se doctrine and to an astute judicial 
455. Kevin B. Smith, Economic Techniques, in PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 450, at 742. 
456. Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920). 
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policy analysis approach for harmonizing nonprescriptive legislative and 
administrative standards with the common law negligence standard. Courts 
should follow three overarching principles in moving toward a systematic 
negligence per se approach involving astute policy analysis not questionable 
intent-based nostrums. First, courts of last resort should candidly insert guidance 
language in their tort opinions urging legislative bodies and administrative 
agencies within the pertinent jurisdiction to set forth whether or not an enactment 
should be used in tort actions and what, if any, excuses should be cognizable. 
Second, in the absence of a clear-cut prescriptive or administrative rule 
establishing a specific standard of care in a tort suit, courts should prefer the 
tradition-based and precedent-based ordinary prudent person under the 
circumstances standard as discerned and applied by a common law jury. As part 
of this principle, courts of last resort should announce a clear rule of 
interpretation that would provide for a baseline traditional negligence standard 
unless the relevant legislative or administrative body made it unmistakably clear 
that it was enacting a more specific prescriptive standard. Third, courts of last 
resort should reserve the judicial power to selectively and rarely borrow 
nonprescriptive statutory and administrative standards to modify the default 
objective reasonable person standard based on astute policy analysis of the likely 
consequences, costs, and benefits of doing so in select cases. 
